

Statement of Dr. Janet Breslin-Smith
House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
May 20, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wittman, Members of the Subcommittee. I want to thank you for your leadership, your concern for the men and women protecting and representing our country, and your active role in a most important congressional activity—oversight. For the first half of my career, I sat on your side of this witness table, as a Senate staff member, advising Senator Leahy on defense and foreign operations appropriations. For the second half of my career I had the privilege of teaching at the National War College and it is on the basis of that experience-- and my recent research on the history of the College-- that I offer my observations about its mission and unique role as well as recommendations concerning the College's future for this Subcommittee to consider.

Your retrospective review of Chairman Skelton's 1989 path-breaking panel on Professional Military Education is timely. Born out of the Goldwater Nichols reforms, Mr. Skelton's work pushed the Armed Forces to make good on its commitment to "jointness" by improving officer education at the intermediate and senior level schools. The Skelton Panel assessed "the ability of the ...military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint war fighters, and tacticians." The Panel looked at the quality of education and had a special focus on strategy.

Now, 20 years later, this subcommittee has to evaluate the performance of PME in a new strategic era, when threat comes from movements as well as nation states, and the ideology of the adversary is a militant theology. The task today is not just moving combat units on the battlefield, but how to influence the political culture in the exotic far reaches of the world. How do we equip our nation's senior officers and national security professionals to meet this uncomfortable and confounding challenge?

Over 60 years ago, General Eisenhower and others asked a related and more basic question in the final hours of World War II. He knew that the next generation of officers would need a new civil-military program in national security strategy to prepare them for higher responsibilities. His idea had the support of Generals Arnold and Marshall as well as Admiral Nimitz and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal. They would come together to propose an experiment in professional military education. The newly created National War College would be the nation's first senior inter-service and inter-agency school to offer a program in strategic military/political studies, on war and politics.

The post-war board that recommended the College had a clear vision of its mission: "the College is concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources to implement that strategy ... Its graduates will exercise a great influence on the formation of national and foreign policy in both peace and war."¹

¹ Gerow Report, 1945, NDU special collections. The College's first annual report defined the mission initially for military officers: "To prepare selected ground, air and naval officers for the exercise of command and performance of joint staff duties at the highest echelons of the armed forces. To promote the development of understanding between high echelons of the armed forces and those other agencies of government which are an essential part of a national war effort." Later the mission evolved to its current definition: "The mission of the National War College is to educate future leaders of the Armed Forces,

Since 1946, the College has been at this task, and has remained remarkably faithful to the founders' vision for the school. Although the College has more than doubled in size from its original 100 students and its core course program has undergone constant review and revision, the genius of Eisenhower's and Arnold's concept lives on. On any given day, in any seminar room, you will hear combat veterans and seasoned diplomats struggle over contentious policy issues; academic specialists and intelligence officers in deep discussion over strategy applied to tribal issues in the Middle East or new threats from space; Army officers comparing wartime experiences with PRT team members from the State Department or USAID who practiced their political or economic skills in the midst of war. It is still a special place.

Mr. Chairman, Secretary Gates could not have designed a better place to develop his idea of the 21st Century national security professional.

Of course, all institutions change over time—shifts in the political environment and new bureaucratic forces push, poke and prod, and attempt to modify the mission, redefine the program, and adapt to changing political currents. The War College has not been exempt from these forces. Indeed, the College, once a well known, independent, professional program for national security senior officials, is now but one part of a larger unit, the National Defense University, in effect a subset of a multifaceted organization including research centers, other schools and colleges, and various outreach activities.

Moreover, its program is no longer totally distinctive. As the other Senior Service Colleges expanded and shifted their curriculum to approximate and accommodate the joint/interagency orientation of the War College and its strategic focus, the College must once again revitalize and renew itself. It must ask: "Is the College still unique? Has it adapted to meet the needs of a new strategic era? What do the nation's senior national security officials—in and out of uniform—need to know and be able to do in the twenty-first century, as strategic leaders? What is different in the leadership preparation at the College—compared to the other Senior Service Colleges or civilian universities-- that continues to warrant its existence as a separate institution?"

These questions take on new urgency with the work of this Subcommittee and the current Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), which will study both Service specific and joint PME curricula as well as overall steps to make JPME "more effective in preparing U.S. military personnel to meet the uncertainties and challenges of future missions." Buried in the DSB study directive may be an implied conceit; I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that today's strategic leaders must give as much premium to "the thinking about" as to the "meeting" of uncertainties and challenges. As an early Secretary of Defense once said, "Asking what to do drives out thought"

That insight, I believe, drove the founders to create the College in the first place. Strategic thinking, in their view, had to be given primacy over operational art and tactical actions, or else leaders would not be able to orchestrate and prioritize the application of state powers to achieve both short and long term national goals. Deep analysis of content, a global perspective, and profound thinking about vision must drive strategy, decisions, actions, and assessments.

State Department, and other civilian agencies for high-level policy, command, and staff responsibilities. To do this, NWC conducts a senior-level course of study in national security policy and strategy for selected U.S. and foreign military officers and federal officials."

Indeed, this was the tradition of George Kennan, the College's first Deputy Commandant², and the author of a strategy--containment--that set the tone and direction for our nation's national security policy through five Republican and four Democratic administrations.

I recently completed a history of the National War College and have reflected on the school's promise and problems. While the College remains faithful to the founders' vision, many of the challenges and issues raised today have been posed repeatedly over the years. If the College is to fulfill its original intention as a "school for strategy," I believe that the Chairman must reclaim ownership of the College. Both the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs must clarify the College's mission, enhance its leadership, establish criteria for appropriate faculty and students, and understand the focus of its curricula. I offer the following observations and recommendations to strengthen the College so it can better serve the nation in this new era. I will also suggest that the College and the University "go back to its roots" and revive the original concept for joint and interagency senior education that Eisenhower and other post-World War II leaders had for the College in 1946.

Mission and Leadership

The Joint Staff and the Chairman need to clarify and support the distinct mission of the College. The College began as an experiment in professional military education and had the active support of President Truman, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and the heads of the Services. Both the War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) anchored a new educational endeavor at Ft. McNair in Southwest Washington that earned remarkable official and public acclaim³. Now there is a sense that both Colleges have become orphans, and that the Chairman and the Joint Staff are detached from the school. The Services are more concerned about their own programs--now all have Joint PME II accreditation. Is the school still unique and needed? Mr. Chairman, it is clear to me that it is. The War College still has a special focus on strategy, a highly developed curriculum, and is truly an inter-agency program with students from the State Department, Homeland Security, Treasury, USAID, the FBI, and the intelligence community. As I mentioned before, it was our nation's first interagency senior school. It has a joint military tradition that is deep and strong, and its extraordinary access to Washington policy makers and world leaders sets it apart.

There has been a significant investment in this College, but to continue to achieve its mission, it needs its senior stakeholders. **The College needs the active involvement of the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, in policies that will strengthen the leadership team for the College, especially in the selection of the Commandant and in the extension of tenure for the position.**

The Commandant. As in the case of any institution, the College needs strong leadership. As a former faculty member, I know how important it is to have a strong and accomplished Dean of Faculty. But I also believe that the selection of Commandant is equally if not more important to the College. As my research reveals, there was originally a set pattern and tenure for

² Kennan was actually the first Foreign Service Officer to serve in the leadership of any senior military school.

³ The Army Industrial College was converted to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 1946 and focuses on mobilization, acquisition, and industrial policy analysis. It is now located next to the National War College at Ft. McNair. At the time the War College opened its door in August, 1946, all major newspapers, newsmagazines and radio reported on its program.

Commandants: a rotation between Services for full three year tours. Admiral Harry Hill, the first Commandant, set the standard, with prior combat experience, intellectual curiosity, and a deep dedication to the mission of the College. Over the years, these standards have given way to limited tenures, frequent turn-over, and lack of either past combat or PME experience⁴.

The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs must address this issue. There must be a review of the criteria and goals for this billet. **Short tours and ill defined powers frustrate even the most dedicated leader.** The College needs committed and intellectually involved Commandants who are given a sufficient length of tenure to become deeply involved in College, teach in the academic program, and engage the students in the strategic dilemmas that mark the War College pedagogy.

The Commandant of this unique joint and inter-agency College could be active duty or retired, but should be selected to match the mission of the school. Ideally, the Commandant should demonstrate a commitment to lead an institution that is a specialized professional school, and be able to hold this position for at least five years. This has been a problem of long standing. In a report to the Commandant in 1953, a member of an academic review team wrote:

The top management has been less effective than it could be expected to be. The reasons....are the relatively brief tenure of the Commandants...and their lack of experience in running an institution of higher learning. Men of fine character, excellent minds, and wide experience have served as Commandants.... But their previous experience did not equip them to head a major, new, high-level academic institution in the exploratory field of national grand strategy under conditions of possible global, total war. And the shortness of their terms of office prevented them for accumulating very much experience....

To attract and mentor new Commandants, an Oversight Board, along the lines of the original Board of Consultants should be reconstituted. From 1946 to 1976, this Board played a vital role in advising, assisting and providing feedback and evaluations for the Commandant and the College.⁵ A revived Board would include, as it did in the past, distinguished former admirals and general officers, ambassadors, cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, as well as academic leaders. Many should be War College graduates. **This Board could function as a selection advisory group for the Chairman, defining the criteria for leadership and reviewing the needs of the school.**

Leadership Structure. But leadership goes beyond the selection of Commandant to the command structure of the College. The school currently has a Dean of Faculty who is a military officer and a civilian Dean of Students, who also serves as Chief of Staff. Is this the right assignment? I believe that the Dean of Faculty should have a PhD, prior teaching experience, and a commitment to the mission of the College. Should the College consider reverting to active duty the Dean of Students billet, while maintaining a civilian Chief of

⁴ The importance of this issue was highlighted in a memo to the Commandant in the mid 1950's: "A commandant requires at least a year to become thoroughly acquainted with the College, but preparations for his second year have to go ahead during the first year, so it is hard for him to innovate before his third year. By the time he has gained considerable experience, he is replaced. (Craig memo, 11 February, 1953:4

⁵ The Board included over the years: General Omar Bradley, Father Theodore Hesburgh, Dr. Bernard Brodie, John J McCloy, among others.

Staff⁶? Underlying these questions are the deeper issues, both for leadership and faculty, on the importance the Joint Staff places on PME itself. **As the active duty forces are stressed by two ongoing wars and a multitude of other responsibilities, it has proven difficult to allow time for officers to obtain advanced degrees, take time out of their career paths to engage at the academic school house. The Defense Science Board needs to address this issue for all the PME schools.**

Faculty

Military Faculty. Throughout its history, the War College debated the criteria for selecting its military faculty and their performance. **The selection of the military faculty for the College is largely left to the individual Services and the criteria lack transparency.** Obviously, the problem is exacerbated in times of war. The demands of deployments and wartime surges stress the ability of the Services to release combat veterans to come back for advance education and to return to teach.⁷ **The problem at its most basic level is whether the Services see teaching at a senior PME institution as a valuable asset in an officer's career or a terminal assignment?**

The College needs intellectually engaged military faculty from a variety of backgrounds. From my view as a former faculty member, I am most concerned about an officer's enthusiasm and ability to teach. This has been a perennial challenge at the War College. Over the years a number of recommendations have been advanced in this regard:

- Offer selected officers opportunities to pursue a doctorate with a future assignment to the College, expand these options for minority officers to broaden the diversity of the faculty.
- Extend the War College tour to three or four years.
- Allow for military faculty above and below the rank of O-6.
- Work with the Services to recruit officers who would best perform at the College.

Agency Faculty. **In an effort to enhance the quality of Department and Agency personnel assigned to the faculty, the College needs to expand its interagency recruitment efforts, to encourage the best match between faculty background and interest in teaching at the College.** The standard set by George Kennan was impressive. He taught and wrote and engaged with the College over his entire career. We need a more tailored selection process with the State Department, USAID, and the intelligence agencies, to increase awareness of the War College program and to alert younger personnel who might want to make longer term career choices based on an eventual tour at the College. Most importantly, the College's ability to attract quality agency faculty depends on how their home agency advances their after teaching.

Civilian Faculty. **The civilian academic faculty presents a series of special challenges.** In the beginning, the College had four civilian "visiting professors," who taught only in the fall semester. As it quickly became apparent, this "visiting" approach provided no continuity or planning for the following year's course and within a short time civilian academic faculty was given multi-year contracts. Currently most of the civilian faculty members are hired under Title 10 of the Federal Code for the Department of Defense, for mainly three year, renewable contracts. There is no tenure process at the College.

⁶ The College needs a full time chief building maintenance officer, to contend with the many challenges of the grand old Roosevelt Hall, a national historic monument.

⁷ A number of the Services are concerned with this issue, notably the Army, which is addressing this tension and working to bring experienced officers for tours at West Point, Leavenworth and Carlisle.

The absence of tenure reflects, in part, the distinct nature of the school and its unique mix of faculty groups. **It was clear from the beginning that the College was not intended to be a typical graduate school, not created to produce researchers but policy and decision makers. The mark of this approach is a faculty of “reflective practitioners” and “applied” professionals, whose careers combined academic and policy experience.** Given the diverse backgrounds of the faculty, the blend of scholars and practitioners (military officers, ambassadors, intelligence officers, and yes, even former Congressional staffers), it is vital that College’s tradition of collegiality be honored.

This has been the hallmark of the College over the years, and appreciated by faculty members in our study who reported that it was rare in “stove piped” Washington to have the sustained opportunity to work and learn with professionals who are “not in your lane.” The College’s gift to the students is the vibrant exchange of views, a mature and vigorous debate between all communities.⁸ The College is an intellectual refuge, which must be protected. **College leadership must continue to set the tone, an atmosphere of academic freedom and professional respect, a commitment to the students and the mission of the College.**

The Student Body

The National War College is designed for its unique study body—men and women in mid-career, who their Services and Departments believe will go on to higher positions in the national security area. But do they? **The process for selection to the War College as well as the decisions for follow-on assignments has always been opaque.** The Services have their own senior service school selection boards and make their own decisions about assignments to the War College or the other PME senior schools. There is a need for an active outreach program to match student selection with the unique program of the College, and to have follow-on assignments use this education. **As this Subcommittee, the Joint Chiefs and the Defense Science Board consider the role of PME and the mission of the National War College, serious attention should be paid to student selection and follow on career assignments. The nation invests scarce resources into the College, a specifically designed program. It should be offered to the most appropriately chosen student body.**

This is easy to say, but a challenge for each Service. By the mid 1950’s, the Commandant of the War College noted that the Services fought to send their best to their own senior schools. **Since the National War College has no “sponsoring” individual Service, the Chairman’s leadership in this area is vital.**

The Academic Program

The philosophy of the school’s program has not changed over the years. As the early student handbooks in the 1950’s noted:

...the best preparation which can be given its students for their future work is an increased capacity to think broadly, objectively, and soundly.... [About].... national security in this increasing complex world in which we live. The emphasis therefore is on the educational process as opposed to the training process. The College does not train its people to be future J-3’s and Counselor of Embassy. But it does strive to make them think in such a manner that they cannot

help but be better J-3's and Counselors of Embassy for having had the experience of attending this College. (*Emphasis original*)

The school's guiding principles have been questioned recently, on three fronts. The first deals with the proper level of analysis for the school, the second with a focus on current or enduring themes, and the third with a U.S. or international focus. All three debates reflect tensions with the broader national security community on these questions.

Strategy or Operations? The College's academic program was established to educate senior military and civilian officials to think broadly and soundly. The program's focus has always been on grand strategy, all the tools of statecraft, as well as joint and interagency operations. But each year there is lively debate over a number of key issues which pose challenges for the future. **Should the College keep the focus on grand strategy or should it focus on the operational level?** There are two components to this question. The first reflects assumptions about the uniqueness of the College and the strategic nature of its curriculum. While the other senior schools are expanding their own programs to include grand strategy as well as joint and interagency topics, **this is the key and central component of the War College program.** Indeed, its curriculum has shifted closer to, not away from, the strategic level of analysis, the broader view of grand strategy using all the tools of critical analysis and statecraft. With the mounting cries that we lack "strategic leaders", it seems that the focus should remain and deepen.

Contemporary or enduring themes. Second, is this focus on grand strategy too abstract, too "next war-itis" in a world of immediate regional threats? Following the attacks from al Qaeda in 2001, the faculty discussed refocusing the course on the Islamic extremist threat. While some faculty members argued that this indeed was the strategic threat of the era, others held that this was merely the "crisis de jour" and thus should not impact the current course offerings. This has been a continuing debate over these past eight years. In this regard, it is useful to go back to the College's earliest days to get a better sense of strategy and threat. In the context of the early years of the school, the "crisis de jour" over Stalin's aggression became the existential threat defining a fifty year campaign.

This is how George Kennan presented the issue in 1946. In the fall of that year, Kennan began the College program with in-depth lectures on Russian history, Soviet psychology, and Communist thought. His careful analysis was critical, and hinged on three basic, but profound, conclusions: 1) the Soviet Union was too large a country to occupy; 2) a war fought with atomic weapons would have no victors, and 3) the ideological appeal of communism had to be countered. These three simple points, and his deep understanding of Soviet motivations, led him to the elegant and enduring strategy which contained the Soviet impulse to expand, set the stage for internal pressures to grow, and countered economic distress which fed the appeal of Marxism.

If Kennan were still teaching at the War College today, I believe he would be deep into a similar critical analysis of "the sources of terrorist conduct". He would be analyzing a movement that crosses borders and is centered by theology not economic ideology.

Of course, this is not the only threat we face. In a post cold war/multi-polar/mixed threat world, settling on a new organizing principal prompts passionate debate. It is China and Russia? Islamic jihadists? Failing states? If it is all of these and more, is there time in the academic year to cover these threats, as well as the basic core course program? **Should the intermediate schools begin this study with the War College providing "booster shot" instruction?** To do

this job adequately would require a two year program⁹ with time to present thorough study of a host of nations and movements that challenge us now: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Iran, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, but also Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba, China, Russia, al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the variety of smaller radical movements, as well as relations with other nations and movements in Europe and Asia, Latin America and Africa in this era of economic crisis.

US or international focus. Underscoring this argument is a third basic question of focus. **Should the curriculum be US-centric or other-centric? That is, should the majority of the academic program consider the United States, our diplomatic history, bureaucratic politics, military history, joint military structures, and our foreign policy and crisis management challenges? Or should more time be devoted to the texture and detail of “the other”?** As my history project revealed, the War College did not offer detailed—or indeed any—courses on Korea or Vietnam during those wars; nothing on the politics, cultural traditions, social or ethnic dynamics of these two battlefield nations. Now there are so many “targets of concern,” that the College does not have the time to provide the same level of texture that Kennan offered in the 1940’s.

This argument about focus is not confined to discussions about the War College curriculum. It can be seen in the larger lively debate within the military on doctrine. Should the military just concern itself with battles and operations or with political development and governance? Traditionally, military studies concentrated on orders of battle, operations, maneuver, envelopments, emplacements, tactics, technology, logistics, and “victory”. Armies faced armies over a battlefield, sea and air campaigns subdued an enemy force. But as war gravitated to complex political conflicts, insurgencies, and now tribal and religious conflicts, the military leadership in our nation is calling for new national doctrine and new definitions of center of gravity. **If the center of gravity in these hybrid conflicts is the population, should the College spend more time educating the students on foreign cultures, religions, and politics? Should the program be less about us, and more about them?**¹⁰ **Can the College maintain its focus on grand strategy; cover all the instruments of statecraft, the national security decision making process, and interagency operations and still talk about warfighting¹¹ as well?**

Following this line of thought, we return to another fundamental question. **Are we to be preparing students for their next job or their job 10 years from now?** From the view of the long term strategist, the War College program should not be restricted to current policy demands, but rather should prepare the students for the challenges a decade ahead, both in and out of federal service. The view of policy from twenty thousand feet and twenty-five miles beyond is necessarily more aggregated, more abstract and analytical, than the highly textured detail of tribes and clans and cabals, either in Afghanistan or the Pentagon. **The JCS established the College as a school for strategists, and it operates at that level, not the operational or tactical.** On the other hand, as mentioned above, the components and subject of strategy seems to be shifting. **How can the College respond to the direction of the current Chairman and the Secretary while being true to the founding goals of the program?**

⁹ A two year program, referencing the past German General Staff structure and its military education system, was proposed by Martin Van Creveld in his study, *The Training of Officers, from Military Professionalism to Irrelevance*. New York: Free Press, 1990/

¹⁰ See “ ‘Military-Political’ Relations: The Need for Officer Education”, by Derek Reveron and Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 1st quarter, 2009.

¹¹ Keeping the war in War College, as students and faculty often quip.

A final observation is in order about Iraq. The dynamic intellectual forces in collision over military doctrine emerged in the past two years as the Army, in particular, came to grips with its frustrations in Iraq. The failure of “speed and precision” to bring final victory, the persistent combat casualties, and lack of political progress in a nation that had been selected as a candidate for democracy fomented intense discussions within the Army and to a lesser extent the other Services. The tensions between the conventional, “Big Army” approach, with new combat systems, a focus on counter terrorism and strength, was contrasted with General Petraeus’ approach to counter insurgency. As the Army debated these approaches to warfare, it questioned its leadership. The spate of books covering the ramp up to the War and its first years¹² were followed by articles from active duty troops themselves, as well as blogs, and on-line journal articles in sites such as Small Wars Journal. One notable article, by then Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, “Failure in Generalship”, offers a crucial assessment of failures of “generalship” in Vietnam and Iraq. The article asserts:

America’s generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy....America’s generals have been checked by a form of war that they did not prepare for and do not understand. They spent years following the 1991 Gulf War mastering a system of war without thinking deeply about the ever changing nature of war... Those few who saw clearly our vulnerability to insurgent tactics said and did little to prepare for those dangers.¹³

Since many of these generals attended the War College during the 1990’s, we must look carefully at this criticism, both in terms of preparing the students for their responsibilities 10 years hence, and more importantly, to encourage that depth of thought that the founders of the school envisioned. Could the College have done more to alert students to the changing character and conduct of war, the growing specter of insurgency, of religious, tribal, violence? Could the College have done more to encourage the students to periodically question the accepted wisdom? **I believe an officer needs the experience of repeated scenarios and the discipline of thought that comes from the use of strategic frameworks to guide analysis.** The pressure to respond to attack, to act, to “do something” in crisis, is so great that only a disciplined education, with appropriate specializations, can prepare an officer to “stand there” and think through the problem, seeing the pitfalls and recommending the best course of action.

An example of the College’s rigor and response to today’s conflict can be seen in its twice yearly oral examinations. Students are given a scenario and must think through the issue, assess the situation and develop a strategic response taking into account the resources of the nation, the domestic context, as well as the international and all the tools of statecraft. One approach for evaluation was designed by Colonel George Raach, a former Army member of the faculty. Raach’s approach reflects the College’s comprehensive program of critical analysis and in depth study. I add this to my testimony to give you a sense of the breath and depth of War College evaluation techniques. Raach suggests that a student be able to reflect on the following questions in this framework:¹⁴.

¹² See Tom Ricks, *Fiasco*; Trainor: *Cobra II*, etc.

¹³ Paul Yingling, “The Failure of Generalship”, *Armed Forces Journal*, May 2007

¹⁴ A similar framework was done by Dr. Bard O’Neill in his courses on terrorism and insurgency.

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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What US interests are at stake? (security, prestige, economic, etc) • How important are they? (vital, major, peripheral) • What are the risks of acting or not acting? • What assumptions have been made? • Is this conflict intrastate or interstate? • What is the root cause of the conflict or dispute? • Who are the antagonists and what are their relationships? • What are the antagonists' resources, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses and likely courses of action? • What are the antagonists' belief systems, both religious and tribal? • What is the antagonists' center of gravity? • When did the problem begin? What are the antecedents? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the political, social and economic Context? • What are the Significant Geographical Aspects of the area? • What are the capabilities of regional organizations? • How long is the operation likely to last? • What are the interests, goals, objectives of coalition partners? • What wild card countries or conditions exist? • Can the policy objectives be obtained with military force? • How will the economic, political, diplomatic, and social elements of power be synchronized with military operations? • How will success be measured? |
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Did War College graduates -- and by this I am referring both to military and civilian graduates -- go through this discipline, planning and preparing for action in Afghanistan or Iraq? Even setting aside this thoroughgoing analysis, and just using the basic components in military campaign planning, did any War College graduate object to less than complete planning or overly hasty operations? Did any note the deficiencies in the so called "Phase Four," post invasion, plan? Why did planners have so little knowledge about Iraq or Afghanistan—history, key leaders, culture, political dynamics—the questions that Kennan would have raised at the time. **At a deeper level, did the College graduates speak truth to power? If the answer to that question is negative, should the College take on the issue in civ/mil relations in more depth? Should the College's existing elective in this area be expanded and include the entire student body? I believe that the students need not only the discipline of the strategic analysis models, but they also need the mental preparation to present their best military advice, even in the face of overwhelming political pressure to "go along".** Some may call this ethics or leadership training, but despite the fact that the College had topics on all three, Yingling did not see it in many commanding officers. We need to confront this issue.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I believe we need to respond to the calls made by the Secretary, the Chairman, and the President to reconsider a "whole of government" or "integrated component" approach in national security, with reference to the balance between the military and the non-military instruments of statecraft, the so called mix of defense, diplomacy and development. Recent efforts to consider national security professional education should review the original 1946 plan by Eisenhower and others for post war professional education: a national security consortium of schools. **As originally envisioned by Eisenhower and the college's founders, the War College and the Industrial College would have been joined by three other senior professional schools: A State Department College, and Administration College and an Intelligence College. These early cold war leaders anticipated the need for interagency competency. I suggest that this subcommittee consider an updated version of Eisenhower's plan, to include a College of Diplomacy and**

Development to compliment the War College’s program and foster great institutional strength at State and USAID¹⁵. I also strongly believe that ICAF, the Industrial College, should also reclaim its roots and revive its focus on industrial studies to respond to the economic crisis currently impacting the country and our national security strategy. This is ICAF’s day in the sun. It is designed for industry studies and economic analysis. It can help the nation evaluate the impact of the economic crisis, our industrial decline, on strategy. The nation needs ICAF to be ICAF, and step up to its responsibility and opportunity in this area.

This proposal suggests a larger interagency review panel, beyond the focus of this subcommittee, but certainly within the vision of Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. I might suggest that the Defense Science Board propose a side study to this effect. **But with or without a broader reform at the National Defense University, the proposals above for the strengthening and focusing of the War College stand.**

The school is too important, the mission never more vital, and the requirement for strategic leaders, with the Kennan spirit, never more important.

¹⁵ The proposal would also include a College for Domestic Security, a College of Domestic National Security, a College of Intelligence and Political Studies, an Information Resources College as well as a War College and a revived Industrial College.