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THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

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Chairman Langevin, Ranking Member Turner, Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Department's Ballistic Missile Defense program. Ballistic Missile Defense is a key strategic issue for the United States and I look forward to testifying and answering your questions about our policies and plans.

In February, the Department of Defense published the report of the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and programs in the context of current and emerging ballistic missile threats to the homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. It provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S. missile defenses.

We are here today to testify on the President's Fiscal Year 2011 request for Ballistic Missile Defense and how it is aligned with the policies and strategies reported in the BMDR. We have taken many steps to ensure a close alignment of budgets with the Defense Department's strategic reviews—not just BMDR but also the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, as it was being developed.

I will first review the key recommendations of the BMDR, and then describe our actions to implement it. The Committee has also asked that I address the European Phased Adaptive Approach in some detail.

Ballistic Missile Threat

In charging the Defense Department with the responsibility to conduct a BMDR, last year's legislation clearly specified the starting point: an updated threat assessment. Accordingly, the review began with a review of the ballistic missile threat and key trends.

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles.

The threat to the Homeland from states like North Korea and Iran continues to develop. Although neither has yet acquired or deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), both are working to acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic missile capabilities, a threat that has proven to be inherently difficult to predict.

Of particular concern, North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear ambitions, and it appears that Iran is determined to continue its long-standing defiance of its international obligations on its nuclear program.

The threat from short- and medium- range ballistic missiles has developed rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North Korea present a significant regional missile threat.

Iran has developed and acquired ballistic missiles capable of striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and Southern Europe. It is fielding increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles and has claimed that it has incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile forces. Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).

North Korea has developed a solid-propellant SRBM, and is developing a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). It has also conducted test launches of multiple theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to threaten U.S. and allied forces.

Strategy and Policy Framework

The BMDR set the following policy priorities based on Presidential guidance:

1. The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.

This remains the top priority for U.S. missile defenses, with a focus on the threat from limited ballistic missile attack by regional actors such as North Korea or Iran. The United States does not intend to affect the strategic balance with Russia or to undermine strategic stability with China. The United States seeks to dissuade states such as North Korea and Iran from developing

an ICBM and, failing this, to deter them from using it or to defeat their attacks should deterrence fail.

2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.

This policy has guided the development of U.S. capabilities since the emergence of the missile proliferation problem in the 1980s. The security of our deployed troops, and our allies and partners, requires this.

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.

We believe in “fly before you buy.” Flight testing under realistic operational conditions is needed and cannot be conducted from facilities not equipped or properly located for this purpose. This will result in a posture based on proven technology with improved reliability, confidence, and cost control.

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.

Our investments in this area must be managed to ensure that there are sound capability improvements at reasonable cost and in overall balance with other defense priorities.

5. U.S. ballistic missile defense capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.

Building capabilities that are mobile and modular ensures we can successfully adapt as the threat evolves, and our own technology advances. Hedging against potential changes in the threat is essential given the uncertainty associated with the ballistic missile capabilities of potential adversaries.

6. The United States will lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.

We will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional security architectures. This theme cuts across all of the Department’s policy and posture reviews. Cooperative efforts are essential to the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and partners. Our

commitment to seeking strategic stability with Russia and China means that engagement with them is also needed.

Defending the Homeland

The U.S. homeland is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past decade in the system based on Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). By the end of this fiscal year, the United States will deploy a total of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, along with the global architecture of sensors and command and control systems. The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.

At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, the United States must be well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments. The focus now must be on maintaining the current level of capability while developing future capabilities that will enhance homeland defense if and as new threats emerge. We are taking the following steps to strengthen our hedging posture:

1. Continue the development and assessment of a two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). The 2-stage GBI is only a development program and no decision has been made to acquire or deploy operational interceptors at this time.
2. Complete construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, Alaska, to the originally planned configuration of 14 operationally-capable silos. Finishing Missile Field 2 will allow us to replace older, inadequate silos from Missile Field 1, provide the most reliable and effective silo configurations to the warfighter, and establish a reserve capability to rapidly deploy up to 8 additional interceptors if needed.
3. Pursue advanced sensors to strengthen existing networks. MDA is currently developing air- and space-based sensors that will bring new capabilities to the fight by allowing us to detect enemy launches, handle larger raid sizes, and track them earlier and longer through all phases of their flight.
4. Invest in advanced technologies such as directed energy and its potential use for missile defense, early-intercept capabilities that allow us to engage threats earlier in their flight,

and the ability to launch interceptors and engage ballistic missiles based on information from external, forward-deployed sensors.

5. Implement Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe which will provide supplemental capabilities for the protection of Europe and the Homeland from Middle East threats.

Defending Against Regional Threats

Over the past decade, significant progress has been made in developing capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Critical new systems have begun to be deployed. But these deployments remain modest in number in comparison to the rapidly expanding regional threat. The BMDR reflects the commitment to significantly accelerate the acquisition and deployment of these mature systems and to invest in follow-on capabilities.

The benefits of improving capabilities are best ensured by tailoring regional deterrence and defense architectures to the unique requirements of each region. The effort to develop tailored approaches will be guided by the following key principles:

1. Regional deterrence must be built on a solid foundation of strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing between the United States and our allies. While missile defenses play an important role in regional deterrence, other components will also be significant. As the Nuclear Posture Review has made clear, the U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain in place so long as nuclear threats to our allies remain.
2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. A key feature of this approach is that it does not require a globally integrated missile defense architecture that incorporates allied capabilities into a uniform, global structure.
3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable.

Let me further explain what we mean by “phased” and “adaptive.” The phases are designed to implement the best available technology to meet existing and potential threats. As more capable interceptor technology is tested, proven, and available, we will phase that technology in to counter the increasing range and complexity of missile threats we face.

The approach is adaptive in that it relies largely on sea-based and other mobile capabilities that can be surged into troubled regions in times of political-military crisis. We must plan to surge for the simple reason that the demand for regional missile defense assets will exceed supply for years to come. Although the missile threat is developing at different rates in different regions, overall it is developing rapidly – both in quality and quantity. Today there are thousands of ballistic missiles and hundreds of launchers; roughly 90 percent of those missiles have ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. Against this threat, the United States currently has only a few hundred defensive interceptors deployed in multiple regions. To manage the supply/demand challenge, the military utilizes the Global Force Management process. This will help to ensure that our missile defenses can face the most pressing regional threats, and that we have capabilities that are responsive to changes in the threat environment.

The BMDR and the Budget

The Department’s budget request aligns with the policies identified in the BMDR and reflects an increased emphasis on strengthening our homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. The Fiscal Year 2011 President’s Budget requests approximately \$500 million more than was appropriated in Fiscal Year 2010. Furthermore, our plan for Fiscal Years 2011 – 2015 is \$3.2 billion above what was planned for last year. MDA Director O’Reilly will provide a more detailed overview of the programmatic investments in Fiscal Year 2011 and beyond.

The legislation mandating the BMDR specifically posed a question about the needed balance between investments in Homeland and regional defenses. Clearly, we need strong investments in both areas. We also need to be well hedged in both against sudden developments in the threat. We also need to accelerate the fielding and further development of capabilities to deal with regional threats because of the dramatic growth in that dimension.

We have emphasized the following key investment priorities for FY 2011 and the five year defense plan:

- To increase the inventory of near-term, mature systems, including interceptors, sensor networks, and command and control capabilities, in order to provide our military forces with what they need now.
- To rigorously test our missile defense systems as they are developed to ensure we are investing in operationally-effective and reliable sensors and shooters.
- To invest in advanced technologies and follow-on capabilities so that we continue to outpace new developments in our adversaries' ballistic missile capabilities.
- To maintain and improve existing capabilities.

We believe these increased investments are essential, and are consistent with a key principle of the BMDR, fiscally sustainable.

Missile Defense in Europe

In conducting the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, we were also specifically directed to assess the pathway forward for missile defense in Europe. Having reviewed the threat and set out our policy priorities, that pathway forward emerged clearly.

- The accelerating threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East pointed to the need to accelerate missile defense protection of U.S. forces and allies in Europe.
- The inherently unpredictable nature of the threat pointed to the need for a missile defense approach with flexibility to adapt to developments in the threat.
- The need to hedge against future threats, whether to U.S. deployed forces, allies, or the Homeland, pointed to the need for an approach in Europe that could be adaptive to this purpose as required.
- The commitment to lead expanded international efforts pointed to the value of a broader alliance approach that would enable effective sharing of burdens and risks.

The “Third Site” approach scored poorly against these objectives. As we began the BMDR, we were constrained by the small number (10) of interceptors that were planned for deployment, meaning the system could be overwhelmed by the launch of as few as five missiles. The high expense of the interceptors made future capability growth doubtful. And the Third Site approach

did not include any specific components for defending our allies and forces from the threat posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

The BMDR developed a more adaptive approach, which utilizes proven technologies that are flexible and responsive to current and future threat developments. Based on the unanimous advice of the civilian and military leadership in the Department of Defense, the President endorsed the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe.

It is useful to recall here the four phases described in the BMDR:

- In Phase 1, out through the 2011 timeframe, existing missile defenses to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles will be deployed. Phase 1 will be accomplished by deploying a forward-based sensor and utilizing BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM-3 Block IA interceptors.
- In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, improved interceptors and sensors to defend against SRBMs and MRBMs will be deployed. The architecture will be expanded with a land-based SM-3 site in Southern Europe and the deployment of SM-3 Block IB interceptors.
- In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, to improve coverage against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a second land-based SM-3 site will be deployed in Northern Europe. This will include use of the more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors on land and at sea to cover all NATO Europe countries.
- In Phase 4, a decade from now, to address the threat of potential ICBM attack from the Middle East, the next generation SM-3 interceptor, the Block IIB, will be available for land-based sites. This interceptor, with its higher velocity, is intended to provide the ability to engage longer-range ballistic missiles and to intercept threats in their ascent phase.

Implementing PAA in Europe

Since the announcement of the new approach to missile defense in Europe in September 2009, the Administration has worked to engage allies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, to begin to

bring together the needed building blocks for this approach. Key milestones in this process to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) are summarized below:

- In September 2009, the Czech Republic expressed its continued strong support for missile defenses and stated its interest in being involved with the EPAA. As we consider ways to cooperate on areas related to the PAA over the longer term, including through research and development activities, we are already in the process of working with the Czechs to establish a near-term arrangement for sharing information on ballistic missile launches.
- In October 2009, Poland agreed in principle to host a land-based SM-3 interceptor site on its territory, as called for in the Phase 3 of the EPAA (2018 timeframe). This site will be located at the same former military installation in northwestern Poland that would have housed the GBI's under the "Third Site" plan. The U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Basing Agreement was signed in August 2008. In February 2010, the U.S. and Poland concluded negotiations on an amendment to that agreement to allow the deployment of a land-based SM-3 site in Poland. Additionally, in 2010, the Polish parliament ratified the U.S.-Poland supplemental Status of Forces Agreement required for the deployment of U.S. forces in Poland, including personnel associated with missile defense.
- In February 2010, Romania agreed in principle to host the Phase 2 Southern Europe land-based SM-3 interceptor site in the 2015 timeframe. The U.S. is preparing for negotiations with the Romanian government concerning the details of hosting the site.
- We are currently in discussions regarding the potential location of the forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar, which we would like to deploy in Southern Europe in the 2011 timeframe. As these discussions mature, we will be able to provide more information.
- We are also working to coordinate our EPAA missile defense efforts with those of our NATO Allies that are seeking to counter shorter-range ballistic missile threats to deployed forces. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring such missile defense capabilities. For example, several have PATRIOT systems (Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Some are working cooperatively with the United States to

develop the MEADS system (i.e., Italy and Germany). Others have expressed interest in acquiring systems like PATRIOT, SM-3, and sensor technology.

These bilateral efforts have been paralleled by multilateral efforts within NATO. The Administration is working to ensure the EPAA is implemented in a strong NATO context – meaning it has NATO’s political support, complements current and future NATO efforts, and offers enhanced opportunities for cooperation.

- The EPAA closely aligns with NATO political guidance on missile defense, issued unanimously in April 2009 by Allied heads of state and government, which states that “missile threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk.” Accordingly, our NATO allies have responded positively to EPAA. NATO unanimously welcomed the PAA at its December 2009 Foreign Ministerial, a key first step in cooperation with NATO on European missile defense.
- NATO is also developing a command and control network that will allow Allies to link their missile defense assets together, called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, creating a more efficient architecture. The United States is working to ensure U.S. assets will be interoperable with NATO’s ALTBMD program. NATO is also examining the implications and costs of potentially expanding ALTBMD to include command and control for territorial missile defense. ALTBMD and potential expansions for it would facilitate greater interoperability and shared situational awareness among Allied missile defense assets.

In combination, these efforts have helped to generate a significant new level of alliance commitment to missile defense. As a result, there is greater potential for cooperation with NATO on a potential Alliance-wide initiative to protect NATO territory from ballistic missiles.

It is important to understand that working to ensure protection of all NATO Allies does not give NATO a “veto” over the protection of the United States and our deployed forces.

Interoperability with NATO command and control systems will not diminish our ability to defend U.S. deployed forces, our allies, and our partners.

All of these efforts represent significant progress towards implementing the BMDR and PAA in Europe -- in just over six months since the announcement of the new approach.

The PAA in Asia and the Middle East

The European PAA is representative of our new approach to regional missile defense. It shows how we plan to apply in practice those policy priorities that we established in the BMDR.

However, it is important to note that the regions differ in the range, scale, and technical sophistication of the existing and potential threat. This variation has important implications for how phased adaptive approaches to missile defense are applied in each regional context. The regions also differ in terms of the U.S. role. In Europe, the United States engages as a party to a multilateral alliance; in East Asia, the United States cooperates through bilateral alliances and with key partners; in the Middle East, the United States has a number of key partners. And the U.S. has deployed forces across the globe. Regional differences have important implications for the authorities under which the United States is able to operationally employ defenses in protection of local partners.

We are also working in East Asia and the Middle East to implement the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in these regions. As I mentioned earlier, these approaches must be tailored to the specific threat and geopolitical characteristics of each region.

- The United States and Japan have made considerable strides in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of bilateral missile defense operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated missile defense system that includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development of a next-generation SM-3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This co-development program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen regional security. The U.S.-Japan partnership is an outstanding example of the kind of cooperation the United States seeks in order to tailor a phased adaptive approach to the unique threats and capabilities in a region.

- The United States also has ongoing discussions with South Korea and Australia related to missile defense and we look forward to further cooperation should either country make the decision to acquire missile defense capabilities.
- In the Middle East, we have a longstanding relationship with Israel on BMD. In addition to conducting a major missile defense exercise with Israel in November 2009, the U.S. and Israel continue to meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense issues. During a recent bilateral discussion in Tel Aviv in March 2010, ways in which elements of the BMDR would help our cooperative efforts to defend Israel were analyzed. This set of bilateral discussions on missile defense will be continued later this year in the United States. In addition to cooperating on plans and operations, our extensive support for Israeli missile defense programs continues to include the existing Arrow Weapons System and a new program for defeating short range ballistic missiles known as David's Sling. Improvements in the U.S. missile defense posture as a result of the BMDR benefits regional stability and benefits Israel's security.
- The United States currently has a robust mix of ballistic missile defense assets forward deployed to provide ballistic missile defense for our troops and facilities in the Persian Gulf Region. This includes the command and control equipment, and personnel necessary to direct BMD engagements. Currently, a series of bilateral MD agreements between the U.S. and host GCC nations exist. CENTCOM continues to work on establishing a Regional Integrated Air and Missile Defense (RIAMD) architecture for the GCC nations.

Cooperation with Russia

As noted in the BMDR, the Administration has given a special emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense. From discussions at the most senior levels, when Presidents Obama and Medvedev met at the July 2009 Moscow Summit, to technical discussions, we are making a concerted effort to identify areas where the U.S. and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation. We are open to a wide-range of cooperative activities.

Some examples of cooperation that we have recently examined with the Russians include sharing data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian radar installations; conducting collaborative missile defense flight-tests; and undertaking experiments that would combine data from U.S. ground- and space-based sensors with data from Russian sensors such as the radars at Qabala, Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia. Pursuant to President Obama's and President Medvedev's agreement at their July 2009 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia are conducting a joint assessment of ballistic missile threats and challenges. Also, we are attempting to work with Russia to implement the 2000 Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) agreement. The JDEC agreement would establish a joint ballistic missile early warning center in Moscow.

Conclusion

In the BMDR we have a new policy document outlining the Administration's approach to missile defense. We have accordingly shifted budgetary requests, increasing investments in missile defenses in the fiscal year 2011 budget. We have already begun to execute those policies as demonstrated by our progress on the implementation of the PAA in Europe, and we are working closely with other allies and partners.

The threat posed by ballistic missiles is real, and it is growing. After years of development, our missile defenses today are also very real, and vital to coping with this growing threat. We look forward to working with Congress in ensuring continued progress.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.