

**Statement of
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Recent Security Developments Involving Japan

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today to discuss recent security developments with Japan. The year 2010 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which serves as the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Our relationship with Japan continues to underpin the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Our Alliance is a fixture in the strategic landscape, not only for the United States and Japan, but as a guiding light for countries throughout the region and a cornerstone of stability. It is a unique relationship, built on common interests and shared values that bind together two very different countries—a relationship that has adapted and continues to evolve to address changes in the security environment, in our political leadership, and in our respective capacities and capabilities.

State of the U.S.-Japan Security Relationship

With the election of the Democratic Party of Japan last fall, we entered a new chapter of our relationship. New personal relationships, styles of governing, and concepts called for a thorough engagement, and we have discussed with our counterparts a host of issues—from our force posture realignment, to consultations on our strategic reviews, to engagements on bilateral cooperation on diverse areas as Missile Defense and Humanitarian Assistance.

Throughout the fall and winter, we focused efforts at finding a way forward on the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa. This topic dominated the bilateral dialogue between our two governments. While that process has been difficult and is still ongoing, it has served to reinforce a broad consensus in both countries that the bilateral alliance is vital to our shared interests and is bigger than any one issue. The Joint Statement issued on May 28 by Secretaries Gates and Clinton and their Japanese counterparts drew media attention because of its discussion of Futenma relocation, but its significance was far broader. In that document both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the 2006 Realignment Roadmap—an agreement negotiated by different governments on both sides—and in turn, to an enduring US presence in Japan, including on Okinawa.

We must therefore keep recent developments in our relationship in perspective. Consider the circumstances of 1960, when the Mutual Security Treaty was signed. Prime Minister Kishi's actions to secure Diet approval of the Treaty sparked massive protests in Tokyo that forced the cancellation of a planned visit by President Eisenhower. Today no mainstream voice in any party, on either side of the Pacific, questions the value of the alliance and our military presence. When you think of where we have been, that is truly extraordinary.

My remarks today will focus on the security aspects of our relationship, and I want to emphasize that our total relationship with Japan includes a broad spectrum of bilateral security activities that extend well beyond the simple management of our bases. Today, I will inform on the current status and way forward with Futenma, but first I will update activities in these other areas of our security relationship that evidence our broad and deep Alliance.

Bilateral Areas of Security Cooperation

First, let me describe some of these wide ranging areas of cooperation. Broadening our cooperative relationship strengthens and advanced our Alliance. For example, U.S.

missile defense cooperation has become a central element in the defense relationship. Japan's investments in four BMD-capable AEGIS destroyers, and the upgrades of its Patriot battalions to the PAC-3 capability, will augment and strengthen the missile defense capability that protects Japan and our forces stationed there. We have also deployed an X-Band radar in Japan to aid in increasing the level of information exchange available to Japan in the event of a threatening launch.

In addition to this cooperation, collaboration between the United States and Japan on the Standard Missile 3 Block IIA is a vital program that will improve our future capabilities. The Block IIA variant is planned to be the foundational component for sea and land-based missile defense capabilities worldwide.

An additional area where we see the potential for cooperation is humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HA/DR. Both sides have given particular focus to enhancing U.S.-Japan HA/DR cooperation to ensure that we will have efficient participation on new operations. Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are increasingly deploying alongside their American partners to address humanitarian challenges in the region, as they did in responding to the 2004 tsunami. Earlier this year, Japan deployed the SDF via U.S. mainland bases to provide relief to Haiti following that devastating earthquake. Going forward, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cooperation will provide countless opportunities for the U.S.-Japan alliance to contribute to the welfare of the region and the world.

One other extremely important area of cooperation is our discussions on strategic issues. Throughout the past 18 months we have consulted with our Japanese counterparts on our strategic reviews: the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Our discussions were frank, honest, and productive and advanced our shared understanding on these topics. Our dialogue and consultations with Japan on nuclear nonproliferation contributed, in my estimate, to a more

comprehensive Nuclear Posture Review. Foreign Minister Okada, in particular, following publication of the NPR stated his support for the document, which is a critical contribution to our efforts to show international support for our extended deterrence posture. We will continue our dialogue with Japan on extended deterrence in the future and are also discussing terms for expanded dialogues on space and cyber defense.

These efforts are just a few of the items on our 50th Anniversary agenda intended to celebrate the achievement of the alliance over the past 50 years and to prepare and strengthen it for the next 50 years. We believe the full spectrum of discussion will position us well for the challenges and opportunities the years to come.

International Contributions

Internationally, Japan has been a quality partner with our efforts in Afghanistan. In addition to contributions that have, most notably, helped construct the Ring Road and pay the salaries of the national police, Japan's \$5 billion pledge towards civil-sector efforts in Afghanistan represents a new way forward for Japan on international contributions. That money will go toward building civilian capacity, the reintegration of militants, demilitarization, and economic development—all critical components of this administration's Afghanistan strategy. Japan continues to assess what additional and appropriate contribution it may be able to make to missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In addition, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force remains active in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa—an operation that has contributed to regional security and the freedom of global commerce. This has been a ground-breaking operation for the Japanese military and shows that Japan is committed to international cooperation on maritime security in the region and globally.

Japan is also sending its Self-Defense Force into more areas than ever before for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Most recently, 350 Ground Self-Defense Force personnel were deployed to Haiti to assist in reconstruction efforts.

Japan is a solid partner in our efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Japan has been an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative since its inception in 2004, and has hosted multiple live exercises. Japan also has been active in helping other states establish and implement controls on the export of sensitive items, to prevent possible their possible use in an illicit weapons program.

Regional Relations

Since coming to power, the Democratic Party of Japan has focused on strengthening Japan's ties with countries in the region. The U.S. welcomes these relationship-building efforts. Perhaps the most significant and positive recent development in regional relations has been the strengthening of trilateral ties among the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Our three nations share values, interests, and a common view of the dangers posed by North Korea's missile and nuclear developments. We have deepened these ties through the Defense Trilateral Talks. Just as the two Northeast Asian alliances are commemorating important anniversaries that symbolize the abiding U.S. commitment—the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War—we are also charting a course to broaden and deepen trilateral defense ties.

Trilateral cooperation among the three nations has been vital in conveying a unified front and a common commitment to move towards complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. U.S. commitment to our allies and their security, together with their strengthening cooperation with each other, is critical to a coordinated, comprehensive approach to North Korea and increased stability and security for the

region. This approach also provides a sound basis for broader, multilateral coordination and cooperation with China, Russia, and other countries.

Security ties between Japan and Australia continue to grow as well. Our respective defense and foreign affairs agencies participate in a regular trilateral dialogue designed to improve trilateral operational cooperation to allow for closer partnerships in areas like maritime security, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping.

A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is also crucial to the success of multilateral cooperation in the region, and we are committed to working with Japan to ensure that Asia's evolving multilateral organizations are inclusive, transparent, and solution-oriented. The United States and Japan can together make sure that these institutions have the capacity to bolster shared peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region.

Realignment Implementation

Throughout the past ten months, we have engaged on multiple discussions with the Government of Japan on realigning our military presence in Japan. Focus on the implementation of the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma has, for certain, been intense. As our two governments have worked to identify ways to reduce the impact of our forces on Okinawa, events in the region conspired to remind all of us of the importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the continued necessity of Marine forces in Okinawa. Actions by North Korea and China at the end of March and mid-April, respectively—the sinking of the CHEONAN and the deployment of a large PLA Navy Surface Action Group through waters near Okinawa—highlighted for many Japanese the vital deterrent role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa and across Japan.

Partly as a result of these events, the Futenma situation, while still unresolved, looks much better today than it did a few months ago. The Joint Statement issued on May 28

by Secretaries Gates and Clinton and their Japanese counterparts designates the location of the new facility in the Camp Schwab area and tasks a bilateral experts group to develop a specific plan by the end of August. That effort is well underway, and we expect the group to complete its efforts on schedule, allowing for a final political decision on relocation this fall. I am confident that this issue, so difficult over the last few months and for the last 15 years, is moving toward a resolution, and that we are on a path to have the tangible progress necessary to enable the relocation of Marines to Guam.

We do recognize that the U.S. presence has real effects on local base-hosting communities. The Secretary of Defense has told his Japanese counterpart that the U.S. is committed to reducing the impact of our presence on Okinawans, and we continue to discuss with the Japanese government ways to do so. Futenma relocation is central to this effort, and we are moving toward a final agreement on the way forward.

Of course, the Futenma Facility at Camp Schwab is a single component of a larger plan to consolidate the U.S. presence on Okinawa and to move our forces away from the densely populated southern portion of the island. The full Okinawa realignment package will allow us to reposition approximately 8,000 Marines from Japan to Guam and return nearly 70 percent of the land south of Kadena Air Base. This will ensure a much more sustainable and enduring presence for U.S. forces on Okinawa that also preserves the Alliance's operational needs and capabilities. Most importantly to the Okinawans, it directly addresses their noise, safety, and environmental concerns.

The May 28 Joint Statement also added further areas of cooperation that will be leveraged to make our presence on Okinawa more positive. For example, the U.S. and Japan pledged to a "Green Alliance" program, pursuing wherever possible upgrades or construction that would use environmentally friendly techniques. Working with other elements of the U.S. government and the private sector, we will explore ways to deliver increased educational, cultural, and environmental programs to the people of Okinawa.

Lost in the focus on the FRF is the fact that most of the 2006 plans for realignment are moving forward with little controversy. We are co-locating our air and missile defense commands at Yokota Air Base, bringing a permanent Japanese presence for the first time onto a base that houses our US Forces/Japan headquarters. The headquarters of the Ground Self-Defense Force's Central Readiness Force, which has lead responsibility for Japan's overseas deployments, will move onto Camp Zama, to be co-located with a transformed U.S. Army command and control structure. We plan to relocate the Carrier Air Wing currently stationed at Atsugi Naval Air Station to Iwakuni in 2014, reducing the impact of our presence in a densely populated community. An additional contribution to U.S. Forces was the arrival of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, at Yokosuka in September 2008, sparking little local opposition. Looking beyond the FRF issue, we are successfully moving forward with a broad realignment that will expand opportunities for bilateral training and operations, while at the same time making our presence more politically sustainable.

Host Nation Support

As a final topic, last week we kicked off new discussions on Host Nation Support (HNS) that will lead to a new agreement that will replace the current agreement set to expire in March 2011. HNS is a strategic pillar of the alliance and an important contribution in terms of the overall cost of maintaining the security relationship. However, we understand that some in Japan question how the money is being spent. We have committed to our Japanese Allies that our new agreement will give Japanese taxpayers the most efficient program possible. It is in our interest to maximize the return on Japan's funding and our own taxpayer resources to support our forces and their families, and to ensure their quality of life while stationed in Japan.

In addition to providing bases, Japan's host nation support, or HNS, is a key strategic pillar of the Alliance. HNS is Japan's tangible contribution towards the maintenance of

the world's most advanced, capable military force in Japan; not only for its defense but also for stability in the region. It is essential that Japan contribute to the Alliance through HNS (as well as through its own forces and in other ways). Japan provides roughly \$1.7 billion per year in HNS, almost all of which is returned to Japan's economy in the form of rents, salaries, or services – a bargain considering the security Japan receives in return. Japan is able to spend less on its own defense as a percentage of GDP (less than approx. 1% of its GDP) because of the deterrence provided by U.S. military forces in Japan. However, further reductions in HNS signals to both friends and potential adversaries in the region that Japan does not take its commitment to its defense seriously. To the contrary, Japan should increase its overall defense expenditures and HNS funding levels as a proportion of the defense budget to demonstrate its commitment to the safety and security of the Japanese people.

Conclusion

The government of Prime Minister Kan has made clear its commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance. While there will certainly be occasional differing ideas on how best to move forward together, this is natural in discussions between two great democracies. By working patiently and persistently, we will ensure the continued expansion and strengthening of our relationship, even as the core commitments remain unshaken.

As Allies and partners we share a commitment to regional security, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and global peace-keeping operations. As President Obama said in Tokyo last year, the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance “represents an important opportunity to step back and reflect on what we’ve achieved, celebrate our friendship, but also find ways to renew this alliance to refresh it for the 21st century.” I look forward to the next 50 years of an alliance that will continue to be indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the United States, of Japan, and of the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.