

STATEMENT BY

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BEFORE THE

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PROTECING THE FORCE FROM THE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

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Chairman Taylor, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Akin, Ranking Member Bartlett, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today on behalf of the men and women of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).

In January I assumed duties as Director of JIEDDO, following in the footsteps of two tremendous leaders, General (Retired) Montgomery Meigs and Lieutenant General (Retired) Thomas Metz. My most recent experience as a division commander in Iraq provides me with a unique perspective and passion on the threat of IEDs and the tremendous support given to the protection of our troops from the Congress, the Department of Defense, the Services, and JIEDDO. Since my arrival, I have been assessing JIEDDO's operating procedures and have examined external criticism of the organization. We are in the process of sharpening JIEDDO's processes for the current counter-IED (C-IED) fight. Our core purpose – rapidly providing C-IED solutions to meet warfighter needs – will remain central to everything we do. JIEDDO will achieve our mission through teamwork with our stakeholders, a willingness to accept risk, the pursuit of innovation, a commitment to accountability, and a relentless focus on defeating the IED.

Our immediate priority is to support the Afghanistan surge. The lessons learned from years of experience with countering IEDs in Iraq, and the unique threats identified by commanders in Afghanistan, inform our vector. There are several ways to look at this problem, but I will briefly speak to three broad areas: total IED activity, including attacks, as well as found and cleared, effectiveness as measured by the casualty rate per incident, and how differences in terrain and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) affect these casualty rates.

First, in terms of the gross level of enemy IED activity, Afghanistan has experienced a near doubling of IED events in the last year with a corresponding significant rise in U.S. and Coalition casualties. Conversely, the Iraq threat is roughly 10 percent of its 2007 peak. The drop of activity in Iraq reflects some tremendous strides by U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces in the prosecution of the Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine and effective C-IED processes. The rise in activity in Afghanistan reflects a resurgent Taliban and the struggle to establish control in the country.

The IED threat in Afghanistan also reflects some disturbing statistics when measured by the casualty per attack rate. Over the past three years in Afghanistan, casualty rates of our warfighters have increased by roughly 50 percent. In other words, each IED attack is causing 50 percent more casualties on average today in Afghanistan, than at this same time three years ago. Iraq, by comparison, has a U.S. IED casualty rate that currently is about half that of Afghanistan.

Several factors explain the difference in lethality between these two theaters. Most obvious is the much more rural terrain in Afghanistan, where we see a predominance of unpaved roads. This facilitates a successful enemy tactic of emplacing

large explosive charges buried in the middle of the road or in culverts. In many areas of the country the terrain does not provide for off-road vehicle mobility and this channelizes our forces on to the roads. Additionally, the enemy uses low or non-metallic content fertilizer-based explosives which frustrate detection. Furthermore, due to terrain and changes in operational strategy U.S. forces are conducting many more dismounted patrols in Afghanistan than in Iraq. Dismounted soldiers are more highly effective in interacting with the Afghan population and finding IEDs, but separated from the protection of an armored vehicle they are also more vulnerable to casualty from an IED.

JIEDDO is determined to counter the enemy's ever-evolving TTPs by rapidly responding to capability gaps identified by the Combatant Commander. We do so through our three Lines of Operation (LOO): Attack the Network, Train the Force, and Defeat the Device.

Attack the Network efforts seek to understand, identify, and disrupt IED bomb makers and their supply sources prior to assembling and emplacing IEDs. JIEDDO's Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, or COIC, works effectively to respond to requests for information and support from theater, integrating information from a wide variety of sources into a single product and rushing it to the warfighter in time to make a difference in the fight. Change detection sensors, improved quality and quantity of surveillance assets, airborne sensors to locate IEDs and their components, and analytical support to C-IED efforts are just a few of the successful efforts undertaken in this LOO.

Train the Force focuses on performance-oriented training of our troops to help them find and defeat IEDs, use Attack the Network analytical tools, and proper staff integration planning. We support Service pre-deployment home-station training lanes that replicates the battlefield for Soldiers and Marines. A key focus is improving battle staff training to improve ISR asset optimization and organizational structure for the C-IED fight. The JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin ensures that collective training across the force is timely, relevant, and accurate to the combat area units will deploy to in the immediate future. It is vital that we replicate the conditions Soldiers and Marines will face in exercises before they are committed to combat. Additional areas of emphasis are on development of simulators and improvement in the use of biometrics, forensics, and weapon technical intelligence information.

Defeat the Device seeks out cutting edge solutions that can detect IEDs on the ground, neutralize them prior to detonation, or mitigate the effects of detonation at the point of attack. Counter-mine detection systems, mine rollers, and trace explosive detectors have proven extremely successful on the battlefield. A significant effort is underway to rapidly add additional persistent surveillance capability to the forces in Afghanistan. Taking control of the roads using airborne and ground based surveillance was successful in Iraq and U.S. Central Command has identified this capability as an urgent requirement in Afghanistan. In the last several months Task Force Odin has been supplemented with U.S. Air Force Liberty aircraft to good effect. We are not where we need to be yet on this capability but are moving rapidly to close this gap. Additionally,

we are pursuing a significant effort to improve detection of homemade explosive devices, a significant threat in Afghanistan.

Our Fiscal Year 2011 budget request reflects the shift in focus and resources required to reduce the effectiveness of IED attacks in Afghanistan. It is comprised of both known and unknown requirements. We work very closely with the Combatant Commanders to ensure we invest in developmental efforts that address known urgent capability gaps, and that the Joint Staff has identified and validated those requirements. Our focus is to rapidly develop, demonstrate, and procure proven C-IED solutions to reduce those gaps. Additionally, we sometimes need to provide C-IED support for the emerging threats that are unknown at the time of our request. JIEDDO's budget request amount combines historic spending on continuing programs with reasoned projections of future threat levels and enemy activity that will form the basis of future requirements. Given the seriousness and urgency of our mission, risk must be a part of our calculus. Our budget development process has made great strides and, as we develop our capabilities across the organization, will continue to improve. Congress's generous appropriations each year have given us the agility to confront emerging threats. We appreciate the great trust and confidence you give to JIEDDO to responsibly manage these resources.

As JIEDDO pursues its planned initiatives or rapidly develops new countermeasures to meet emerging IED threats to our warfighters, we will continue to rely on our capabilities generation and acquisition management practices – the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process, or JCAAMP. Through this process, JIEDDO develops and procures C-IED initiatives to get solutions to the battlefield as quickly as possible.

Early in JIEDDO's organizational development, we recognized the need for an affordable information technology architecture that could support our unique rapid acquisition management processes, as well as evolve to incorporate new functional requirements. The JIEDDO Enterprise Management System (JEMS) is a web-based architecture intended to be the umbrella technology solution to support collaborative staff action workflow and JCAAMP actions. The initial effort to implement JEMS has focused on creating and maintaining an authoritative information repository for each C-IED initiative through all phases of JCAAMP. In its final form, JEMS will incorporate the major processes in all functional areas of the organization, and enhance necessary decision making to rapidly provide effective portfolios of C-IED solutions to the warfighter. In concert with JCAAMP, JEMS will provide a high level of transparency throughout the Department to reduce duplication of effort as much as possible. These mechanisms will also greatly facilitate and enhance the development of new levels of internal management controls expected by the Congress and taxpayers.

As a rapid response organization, JIEDDO prides itself on agility, flexibility, and the willingness to take necessary and calculated risks. The Joint IED Defeat Fund (JIEDDF) provides us the ability to function in an ever-changing and volatile theater environment. JIEDDO is currently responding to immediate equipment needs in

Afghanistan by deferring some of our research and development efforts for later years. With the JIEDDF, we are able to instantly apply resources to the Combatant Commander's most critical needs. As this capability is instrumental to the IED fight, I will ensure we exercise appropriate controls, ever mindful of the trust placed in me by the Congress and the American taxpayer. Even as we increase our materiel support to Afghanistan, the drawdown in Iraq further complicates this picture. We will continue to work closely with the theater commanders to identify the appropriate reappportionment of C-IED assets from Iraq to Afghanistan.

In its efforts to protect the force by supporting the Combatant Commander, JIEDDO will continue to aggressively lead the Department of Defense's efforts to find and develop C-IED capabilities, as well as enable attacks against the networks that employ this lethal weapon. We keep the Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine in combat foremost in our daily work as we endeavor to protect the force and provide our warfighters the safety and confidence they need to achieve the mission.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.