

RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. MCHUGH  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

AND

GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY JR.  
CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES ARMY

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**Introduction**

America's Army continues to answer the Nation's call, as it has since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is fighting two wars, assisting other nations as they build their own security capacity, supporting civil authorities at home, helping the people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing to deter and defeat new threats. The Army's Soldiers, Civilians, and Families faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them. With the support of the Congress, we are on track with our four-year plan to put the Army back in balance.

Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation continues to recognize and honor our Soldiers and their Families by supporting them before, during, and following deployments. Our Soldiers rely upon the best training and equipment that our Nation can provide to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the demands of eight years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain of multiple deployments is evident on Soldiers and their Families. Equipment is used at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance and replacement capabilities and resources. The stress is present in our institutions as we change 20th-century systems and processes to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where, and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting important priorities at home. However, when the security of our citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can depend on **America's Army – the Strength of the Nation.**

### **Strategic Context**

The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array of diverse security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while preparing for future challenges to our national security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such as Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the most immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in demographics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and competition for scarce resources exacerbate the uncertainty and volatility of the strategic environment. Within this setting, the American Soldier stands as our Nation's most visible and enduring symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict.

### **Persistent Conflict**

For the near future, persistent conflict – protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends – will characterize the global security environment. Security crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and last for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies will continue to be frequent and unpredictable missions, requiring the commitment of

Soldiers and resources. In this dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously.

### **Global Trends**

Several global trends will continue to shape the international security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation. Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of benefits creates societies with divisions between “haves” and “have nots” – divisions that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict. Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt unpredictably as societies struggle to adjust to the move toward modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, increasingly available and affordable technology provides our adversaries sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the disenfranchised and exporting terror.

Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is increasingly urbanized can continue to break down traditional, localized norms of governance, behavior, and identity, and further strain already stressed governments. This is especially true where a lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived Western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water, and food, is a consequence of growing prosperity and populations. The growing global competition for resources will continue to produce friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment, climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in developing countries by igniting

humanitarian crises, causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic attack utilizing WMD has the potential to be globally destabilizing. Failed or failing states, lacking the will or capacity to maintain effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant and compelling threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the decades ahead more likely.

### **Character of Conflict in the 21st Century**

Global trends and recent conflicts – such as those in Lebanon and Georgia – and our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving character of conflict in the 21st century.

Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors – state and non-state – with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century, remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and often the identities of these actors will be difficult to discern, and are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use proxies. The battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged among the people.

The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are more susceptible to the potential for spillover, creating regionally, and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All of this will occur under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle and the internet. Details of

conflict as well as misinformation will flow equally across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our adversaries will exploit these media and communication sources locally and globally.

We are more likely to face hybrid threats – diverse and dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages. Hybrid threats require hybrid solutions – adaptive military forces that can function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national, allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment, enduring global trends, and the character of 21st-century conflict, the Army will operate as part of a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multi-national team to fulfill its global commitments.

### **Roles of Land Forces**

More than one million of our men and women have served in the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American Soldiers have given their lives, and more than 25,000 others have been wounded during this longest period of sustained conflict ever fought by an all-volunteer force. Today, America's Army has over 255,000 Soldiers and more than 18,500 Army Civilians serving in nearly 80 countries around the world – with the remainder stationed within the United States supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or preparing for an upcoming deployment.

Our Soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every day, and the roles for land forces in this environment are becoming increasingly clear.

First, the Army must **prevail in protracted counter-insurgency**

**(COIN) operations**. Not only must we prevail in our current missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail in any future COIN operation.

Second, the Army must **engage to help other nations** build capacity and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny sanctuary to terrorists – thereby helping avoid future conflicts that might otherwise develop. American Soldiers are currently deployed to Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and humanitarian organizations in Africa.

A third role that the Army fulfills is to **provide support to civil authorities** at home and abroad. In the past year alone, American Soldiers have fought fires in the west, conducted search and rescue operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The Army has also provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army units from both the active and reserve components remain prepared to react to a variety of crises as consequence management and response forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in providing DoD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home and engineering support to USAID overseas. Abroad, the Army has also supported civil authorities in many ways, such as sending Agribusiness Development Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan.

Finally, the Army must deter and **defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors**. As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to meet and defeat hostile state actors that threaten our national security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that will challenge America's military head-on is lower than it was during the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness and capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising the stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our security interests.

To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in Joint and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army continues to position forces in Korea and at various missile defense sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional stability and security.

## **Two Critical Challenges**

The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last eight years, and while it has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance. Demand for Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable supply. Against that backdrop, the Army continues to meet the wartime requirements of our Nation while it addresses the two major challenges facing our force – **restoring balance** and **setting conditions for the future**. In 2007, we established a four-year plan to restore balance to an Army that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict. The FY 11 budget supports the final year in that plan. As we continue to restore balance to the force, we are also setting the conditions for the Army of the 21st century - an Army that fulfills our strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force.

## **Restoring Balance: The Army's Four Imperatives**

With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over the past three years in our plan to restore balance – a plan founded on four imperatives. Yet today the Army remains out of balance. We've improved our ability to **sustain** the Army's Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; **prepare** forces for success in the current conflict; **reset** returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies; and **transform** to meet the demands of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in a better position to achieve balance than we were two years ago. Critical to this was the growth in the size of the Army.

The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban areas to Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard work and sacrifice of our Soldiers with the support of Congress helped make this achievement possible and set the conditions for our responsible drawdown of combat forces in Iraq this year. Coupled with our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the Taliban insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 more Soldiers were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the height of the Iraq surge.

Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress our Soldiers, Families, Civilians, equipment, and institutional systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not waiver.

## ***Sustain***

Sustaining our all-volunteer force is our first imperative. Nowhere is the stress on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on our people, as is tragically evident in the rising number of suicides and increasing need for counseling among our Soldiers and Families. We are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and seeking to build resilience in Soldiers, Families and Civilians. The Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who serve the Nation is commensurate with the quality of their service.

## **Goals**

To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major goals. Our first goal is to Recruit and Retain quality Soldiers and Civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to furnishing the best Care, Support, and Services for Soldiers, Families, and Civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant, Army Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. It is our solemn obligation to provide world-class Warrior Care and Transition to our wounded, ill, and injured Warriors through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition Units. Finally, by Supporting the Families of our Fallen Comrades we honor their service and sacrifice.

## **Progress and Accomplishments**

- The Army met 104% of its recruiting goals for 2009, and achieved both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits.
- All components exceeded 105% of their reenlistment goals.

- We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20%, to include a 15% reduction in overall privately-owned-vehicle fatalities and 37% reduction in motorcycle fatalities.
- In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army began a seminal study into suicide prevention that will inform the Army Suicide Prevention Program and society's approach to suicide.
- We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness – an all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family, and physical fitness – as the foundation to building resiliency within the Army.
- We initiated an unprecedented series of construction projects at five major hospitals as part of our commitment to modernize our healthcare system.
- The Army established the Warrior Transition Command and reorganized Warrior Transition Brigades to provide centralized support, rehabilitation, and individualized transition planning to our recovering Warriors.
- We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 Family members, providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for the Families of our Soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice.
- We implemented the Post 9/11 GI Bill, significantly increasing educational benefits for active duty Soldiers, Veterans, and Family members.
- The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community Centers to support geographically-dispersed Soldiers and Families. Together

with Army National Guard Family Assistance Centers and Soldier and Family Assistance Centers on active duty installations, these centers provide help to Soldiers' Families near their hometowns.

### **FY 11 Budget Highlights**

- Provides \$1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital Family programs and services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and child care; Survivor Outreach Services; and expanded education and employment opportunities for Family members.
- Provides a 1.4% military basic pay raise and Civilian pay raise, a 3.9% basic allowance for housing increase, and a 3.4% basic allowance for subsistence increase.
- Warrior Transition Units for our wounded Soldiers will continue to receive strong support in FY 11 with \$18 million in Military Construction funds allocated to resource construction of barracks spaces.
- Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program, which provides quality, sustainable residential communities for Soldiers and their Families living on-post, and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for those residing off-post.

### ***Prepare***

Our Soldiers face determined enemies – so preparing the force for our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for success. Our units must have the people, training, and equipment they need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in sufficient

quantities.

### **Goals**

To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated the pace at which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to grow our modular brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly 230 Support Brigades. Second, the Army is committed to improving individual and collective Training to better prepare Soldiers and leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we continuously work to provide our formations with effective Equipment in a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our most critical resource – the Soldier. Finally, we must transform the Army to a rotational model – Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) – the core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a sustained and rotational basis – to meet current and future strategic demands.

### **Progress and Accomplishments**

- We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the Reserve Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in September 2009, and followed by the Active Army in January 2010. Today, no mobilizing or deploying units have stop-loss Soldiers in their ranks.
- The force achieved its “Grow the Army” end strength goal of 1.1 million in 2009. The active component continues to grow toward its additional authorized Temporary End Strength in order to improve unit manning within the already existing Army structure as we eliminate stop-loss.

- Fifteen-month tours effectively ended in November 2009, when the last Soldiers on those extended deployments returned.
- We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and delivered the first MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATVs) to Afghanistan – just 15 months after identifying the need for that capability. As of the beginning of February, we have provided nearly 800 M-ATVs to Afghanistan.
- This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped, and deployed 67 brigade equivalents.
- The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90% for ground equipment, to include MRAPs, and 75% for aviation.
- We established Army Training Network (ATN) - a 21st Century Approach to Army Training. This revolution in training knowledge access is now providing a one-stop portal to share training best practices, solutions, and products across the Army.
- The Army increased its employment of biometric technologies enabling the Army to better identify the enemy among the populace.

### **FY 11 Budget Highlights**

- Funds permanent, active component end strength at 547,400; Army Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200 in the base budget and supports a 22,000 temporary increase in the active component through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

- Procures and upgrades the Army's UH-60 Black Hawk, CH-47 Chinook, and AH-64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Provides over \$1 billion for flight crew training in all components to fund flying hours, maintenance, fuel, airfield operations, and specialized skill training.

### ***Reset***

With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the past eight years, we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. Reset restores returning units – their Soldiers, Families, and equipment - to a level of readiness necessary for future missions.

### **Goals**

Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to Revitalize Soldiers and Families seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships following deployments. The Army's comprehensive efforts to Repair, Replace, and Recapitalize Equipment affected by the harsh environments of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces and equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset effort. The Army must Retrain Soldiers, Leaders, and Units to build critical skills necessary to operate across the spectrum of conflict in the current security environment. Lastly, we are identifying and applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset process. Army Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only as long as we have forces deployed, but an additional two to three years after major deployments end.

### **Progress and Accomplishments**

- The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades' worth of equipment in FY 09 and continued the reset of 13 more. In total, we have reset more than 98,000 pieces of equipment as depot production has doubled since September 11, 2001.
- We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq which will redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million pieces of equipment; redeploy 143,000 military and Civilian personnel, and 147,000 contractors; close 22 supply support activities; and consume or dispose of over 21,000 short tons of supplies.
- In 2009, more than 160,000 Soldiers and Family members participated in over 2,600 Strong Bonds events designed to strengthen Army Families.
- The Army continues to revise its approach to training by emphasizing doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use of field time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams and distributed learning.
- We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin instituting the full Reset model across the Army in 2010.
- The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than \$24 billion in new foreign military sales.

### **FY 11 Budget Highlights**

- Provides \$10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request.

- Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to include individual skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the ARFORGEN process.

### ***Transform***

Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the combatant commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a continuous process that sets the conditions for success against both near-term and future enemies.

### **Goals**

Our goals for transformation include continued Modular Reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. We will accelerate fielding of Advanced Technologies to ensure our Soldiers retain their technological edge. The Army will Operationalize the Reserve Components by systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for these Soldiers, Families, employers, and communities.

Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) statutes is central to Restationing Forces. Soldier and Leader Development will ensure that we produce the next generation of agile and adaptive military and Civilian leaders who are supremely competent in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad enough to operate effectively in the Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multi-national environments.

### **Progress and Accomplishments**

- The Army is 88% complete on the modular conversion of its brigades. The FY11 budget will support the near completion of this process.
- The Army consolidated existing aviation force structure to create a 12th active component combat aviation brigade (CAB) forming an additional deployable CAB without adding force structure.
- The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to prepare combat advisors to train and build capacity in foreign security forces. Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to Afghanistan to assist with the training and development of the Afghan Security Forces.
- The Army developed a new incremental capability package approach to modernization which will allow technologically mature, Soldier-tested, proven technologies to be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to the force more quickly than ever before.
- We provided combatant commanders with dedicated, regionally based network operations support, and integrated cyber security capability in the form of Theater Network Operations and Security Centers, unique within the Department of Defense.
- This past year, the Army closed three active installations and five U.S. Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in FY 11. To date, we have awarded 265 major military construction projects, of which 59 are complete.
- The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that balances experience, greater opportunities for professional education, and

training in full spectrum operations.

### **FY 11 Budget Highlights**

- Invests nearly \$3.2 billion in BCT modernization programs that include procurement of the first incremental changes packages for Infantry BCTs and additional research, development, testing, and evaluation funding for subsequent change packages as well as initial development of the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
- Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th Combat Aviation Brigade.
- Supports the increase in ISR platforms to include the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the Extended Medium Altitude Reconnaissance and Surveillance System.

### **Setting Conditions for the Future**

#### ***21st Century Army***

The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the conditions for the future through a continuous process of transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and range of military options to meet the evolving challenges we face in the 21st century. **We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against unexpected contingencies – at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our all-volunteer force.**

Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army. It enables our forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across

the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker, and light brigades provide a **versatile mix** of forces that can be combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major combat operations.

Our modular units are designed to be **tailorable**. Brigades now have capabilities previously found at division level and higher. These brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions and increase the land options available to combatant commanders.

The network is essential to a 21st-century Army. **Networked organizations** improve the situational awareness and understanding leaders need to act decisively at all points along the spectrum of conflict, while providing connectivity down to the individual Soldier. The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate together, and provides connectivity to Joint, combined, and interagency assets. To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network capable of supporting an expeditionary Army.

To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo sustainable for our all-volunteer force, we will put the whole Army under a rotational model – ARFORGEN.

The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools—Reset, Train-Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contains a versatile

force package, available at varying time intervals based on its readiness level. Each force pool consists of an operational headquarters (a corps), five division headquarters (of which one or two are National Guard), twenty brigade combat teams (three or four are National Guard), and 90,000 enablers (about half of those are Guard and Reserve). Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once we reach a steady-state, ratio of time deployed (known as “boots on the ground” or BOG) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for active component forces and 1:4 for reserve component forces. This versatile mix of land forces could sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At lower demand levels, a sustainable BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for active component forces and 1:5 for reserve component forces provides ready, global reaction forces and regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of Theater Security Cooperation Programs. This process also allows strategic flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across the spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces available for longer commitment times.

The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of our active component (AC) force, require that we continue to integrate reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, and is improving the overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient Army National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises. We are building an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included in the rotational cycle, but at a deployment rate of about half that of their AC counterparts.

The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for Soldiers,

Families, employers, and communities, and enables our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation with the strategic depth (i.e. those non-deployed units which are two to three years from commitment) and operational flexibility to meet unexpected contingencies.

The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our modernization efforts and need for institutional adaptation.

### ***Realizing Change***

To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the 21st century, we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs and efforts that show the most promise for today and tomorrow. Similarly, we are transforming business processes across the Army, including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide materiel capabilities to our Soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to align with the ARFORGEN process.

On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the defense program as part of the President's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2010. The Secretary's decisions had an immediate and major impact on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGV portion of FCS, directing that we "reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program...." He further directed the Army to "accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all

combat brigades,” and retain and deliver software and network development program in increments, and incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates’ intent for these bold adjustments was clear – to better reflect the lessons that we were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces for a broader range of future challenges.

To fully implement the Secretary of Defense’s direction, the Army has developed a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the Army’s “Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan,” which is a subset of our overall Army Modernization Strategy

### **BCT Modernization Plan**

We will leverage the lessons learned from the last eight years to provide effective and affordable equipment now, while reducing the time it takes to develop and field new and updated materiel solutions. BCT Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force; incorporating MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a new Ground Combat Vehicle that meets the requirements of the 21st-century Army; and incrementally fielding Capability Packages that best meet the needs of Soldiers and units as they train and then deploy.

### **Army Network**

Central to the Army’s modernization efforts is an enhanced and interoperable communication network that gives the Army a decisive advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network supports leaders in making timely, informed decisions, and supports organizational agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our Soldiers to know where the enemy

is, where other friendly forces and civilian populations are, and what weapon systems are available for them at any given time. The network links Soldiers on the battlefield with space-based and aerial sensors, robots, and command posts – providing unprecedented situational awareness and control and enabling the application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield.

Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge. The Army's battle command network must be continuously upgraded to ensure security and provide improved capability, capacity, connectivity and operational effectiveness. The Warfighter Information Network (Tactical) (WIN-T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, such as high definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) was born Joint with the specific requirement to resolve radio interoperability among the services. It will provide Soldiers at the tactical level with connectivity at extended ranges, including voice, data, and video, enabling them to move information from platoon to higher-level command posts in complex terrain (including urban and mountainous areas).

### **MRAP Strategy**

In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by providing significantly improved protection for our Soldiers. The Army is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP as the foundation for the M-ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of vehicles provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the battlefield, particularly in an IED

environment, with the best protection we can provide.

### **Ground Combat Vehicle**

Combining the lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP, the tactical mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the operational mobility of the Stryker, the Army is developing a Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that possesses all of these qualities. Providing Soldiers protected mobility is our top design criteria. The first combat vehicle designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have enhanced mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and off-road environments. It will be designed to host the Army's network. And perhaps most importantly, it will have the capacity available to accept future upgrades incrementally as technologies mature and threats change.

The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary requirements and be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will combine sustainability features that match the availability rates of the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current vehicles of similar weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in seven years.

### **Capability Packages**

Capability packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to enable our deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel solutions based on the evolving challenges of the operating environment. The best available capabilities will go to the Soldiers who need them most, based on the threats they are likely to face. These bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine, organization, and training to fill the highest

priority requirements and mitigate risk for Soldiers. This incremental packaging approach will enable leaders to make timely, resource-informed decisions, and will help ensure that we provide the best available technologies to fulfill urgent needs to Soldiers in the fight – all driven by the cyclic readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade our units as they prepare to deploy by providing them improved capabilities such as precision fires and advanced Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

### **The Army Modernization Strategy**

The Army's Brigade Combat Team Modernization Plan is a key element of our overall **Army Modernization Strategy**. The Army Modernization Strategy reflects our overarching vision of how we will achieve our ends, which is to:

*Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow Soldiers and units to succeed in both today's and tomorrow's full spectrum military operations.*

The **Army Modernization Strategy** relies on three interrelated lines of effort:

**1) Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified capability “gaps” through traditional or rapid acquisition processes.** In support of this Line of Effort in FY11 we have requested \$934 million dollars to develop the Army's new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV), which will overcome critical capability gaps in both current and future operations. It is envisioned to have the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational mobility of a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also requesting \$459 million dollars to procure the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable platform, which is already making a difference in Operation Enduring Freedom, gives commanders longer dwell ISR capabilities across a joint area of operations.

**2) Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions.** Army efforts in this Line of Effort include our request for \$887 million dollars for the procurement of 16 Block III AH-64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH-64 Helicopters to Block II. Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested \$505 million dollars to upgrade Shadow RQ-7 UAVs. This key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders.

**3) Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in accordance with the Army Resource Priorities List (ARPL) and Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model.** Meeting the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the demands of persistent conflict will require unprecedented agility in our equipping and modernization programs. One example of this agility can be found in our Kiowa Warrior fleet. We are currently maneuvering our fleet of OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopters to meet Army and COCOM requirements based on the ARFORGEN model. As Air Cavalry Squadrons return from conflict, their OH-58D helicopters are placed into Reset. Units in Reset have very few aircraft, if any. Because the Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall,

when the squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN, they are provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct training (25), but less than what they are fully authorized (30). When the units move into the Available phase, they are provided their full complement of aircraft. It is this agility that has allowed Army forces to meet the needs of theater commanders for over eight years of sustained combat.

**What do we need?** Congress has been very supportive of Army Modernization needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured that the Army Soldier is the best equipped and most respected combatant in the world. In order to execute Army Modernization and ensure the continued success of Soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. **For FY11, we have requested \$31.7 billion** for procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts.

### **Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business Practices**

In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming our institutional Army. As required by Section 904 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army's Chief Management Officer (CMO) has allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance with Section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the development and implementation of a comprehensive program that establishes a series of measurable performance goals and objectives. Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following:

- Developing and implementing a business transformation plan focused on running the Army as effectively and efficiently as possible.
- Continuing the Army's business process reengineering activities, led by OSD's Business Transformation Agency.
- Developing an integrated business systems architecture that emphasizes transparency and seamless access to data, and provides timely and accurate information to decision makers.
- Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in inculcating the Army with a cost-conscious culture.

While the Army transformed its operating force – building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments – the institutional Army continued to use processes and procedures that were designed to support a pre-9/11 Army based on tiered levels of readiness. To support this new operating force, the Army must have an updated institutional Army – our generating force.

Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously adapt, – tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting training, manning, and equipping – to ensure units have all of the physical and mental tools necessary to succeed.

Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that present themselves. To that end, the CMO and Office of Business Transformation will build upon progress that has already been made toward the Army's institutional adaptation, specifically:

- Improvement of the ARFORGEN process – aligning the generating force and its processes to better support Soldiers, Families, and units within the operating force.
- Adoption of an Enterprise Approach – developing civilian and military leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of Army objectives and resources to make better decisions for the Army.
- Reformation of the requirements and resource processes – delivering timely and necessary capabilities at best value.

This transformational approach will overlay everything that the institutional Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and efficiently providing trained and ready forces to meet combatant commander requirements.

### **Stewardship and Innovation**

The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the resources it is provided by the American people through Congress. The establishment of the CMO and initiatives related to the transformation of Army business practices represent the Army's effort to act as a responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to conserve resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible.

The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive contracting.

Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army.

The Army is recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former contracted positions that were associated with inherently governmental functions. In FY 09, the Army saved significant resources by in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army Civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in FY 10, and are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during FY 2011-2015, of which 3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions were identified in the Army's on-going contractor inventory review process.

In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared interests in recruiting, training, and credentialing highly skilled Citizen-Soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more than 800 partnership agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police departments.

Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons systems, and operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy security strategy, and is acting now to implement initiatives to make us less dependent on foreign sources of fuel and better stewards of our nation's energy resources. In support of these goals, we fielded the largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. Energy will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and create a culture of energy accountability, while sustaining or enhancing operational capabilities.

The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program, the Army protected more than 28,000 acres of land at 14 locations in FY 09. Through creative solutions, the Army continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands.

## **America's Army - The Strength of the Nation**



The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our all-volunteer force are hallmarks of the Army -- the Strength of our Nation.

Our Soldiers and their Families quietly bear the burdens of a Nation at war. Our Civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that eight years of combat has taken, these great Americans continue to step forward to answer our Nation's call. In an environment in which we must make hard choices, they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their dedication and sacrifice.

To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the future. We have made significant progress this year, but challenges remain. The continued support of Congress will ensure that the Army remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. **America's Army – the Strength of the Nation.**

**Addendum A – The Fiscal Year 2011 President’s Budget**

The FY 11 President’s Budget asks for \$245.6 billion for the Army. This budget, which includes \$143.4B for the Base and \$102.2B for the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request, is necessary to: support current operations, increase forces in Afghanistan, responsibly drawdown in Iraq, sustain the all-volunteer force, and prepare for future threats.



Amounts requested by major appropriation category in the FY 11 President’s Budget include:

**Military Personnel**

The FY 11 budget requests \$71.0 billion, a \$300 million increase over FY 10. Military Personnel funds support Army end-strength requirements for a Nation at war. This includes \$1.2 billion for the temporary wartime increase in personnel, an increase of \$684 million over FY 10.

This amount funds pay, benefits, and associated personnel costs for 1,110,600 Soldiers: 547,400 Active, 358,200 Army National Guard, 205,000 Army Reserve and funds an active component temporary end strength increase of 22,000.

The OCO request will fund special pays, incentives, and the mobilization of reserve component Soldiers.

**Compelling Needs:**

- Support the Army's base endstrength and the temporary end strength increase in FY 11 to reduce strain on the force
- Sustain authorities and funding of programs in support of wounded, ill, and injured Warriors and their Families as they transition back to duty or to civilian life
- Provide recruiting and retention incentives and benefits to sustain the quality of our all-volunteer force, allow the Army to meet end-strength objectives, and achieve Army standards for recruit quality
- Enable the transition of the reserve component to an operational force by systematically building and sustaining readiness across the force and fund mobilization of RC units to support growing demand

**Operation and Maintenance**

The FY 11 budget requests \$107.3 billion – a \$7 billion increase from FY 10. Operation and maintenance funds Soldier and unit training; ground and air vehicle operating costs; depot maintenance; base operations, sustainment, restoration, and modernization; and a 1.4% Civilian pay raise.

The OCO portion of the request includes \$628 million for the training and sustainment of the temporary wartime increase in personnel – an increase of \$242 million from FY 10.

The budget request works to restore balance to the force by recognizing \$587M of enduring requirements for training and depot maintenance in the base rather than in OCO. The base funds home station training for 59 brigade combat teams, 24 rotations through the Army's combined arms training centers, and an increased investment of \$154M in scholarships, language and individual training. It improves network security; operationalizes the LandWarNet; supports continued development and fielding of administrative systems; and provides funding for improvements in financial audit readiness (as required in NDAA 2009) by requesting an additional \$578M above the FY 2010 levels for these activities. The base budget also increases funding for facilities sustainment restoration and modernization by \$320M and includes one-time requests to support BRAC and the transition out of NSPS.

The OCO request will fund the day-to-day cost of the wars, training to prepare units for deployment, force protection, in-theater maintenance and repair, drawdown of equipment from Iraq, and reset of Army Prepositioned Stocks and equipment returning from deployment.

**Compelling Needs:**

- Sustain readiness through Soldier and unit training, including realistic, full spectrum training at the Army's three combat training centers
- Fund the reset of 30 brigades, other enabling units, and equipment

- Resource installation services worldwide and support the Army Family Covenant to provide Soldiers and their Families the quality of life they deserve and to enhance the health of the force

### **Procurement**

The FY 11 budget requests \$30.3 billion – a \$200 million decrease from FY 10. Procurement funds the Army's future force equipment requirements; sustains modernization and recapitalization; and fills equipment shortages. The OCO request will fund procurement of weapon systems to replace battle losses, replacement of equipment taken for current operations from the reserve components, and to fill urgent operational needs for deployed forces.

#### **Compelling Needs:**

- Fund the fielding of the first Capability Packages to two more Army brigades
- Enhance Army command and control by providing an initial on-the-move networking capability resident in the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T), Increment 2
- Increase the Army's tactical agility through an aviation modernization strategy that highlights the increasing importance of unmanned aerial systems (ERMP, Shadow and Raven) and rotary wing aviation (AH-64D Block III Apache, UH-60M Black Hawk and CH-47F Chinook)
- Improve lethality and precision fires by modernizing the Patriot PAC-3 missile, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and the Paladin howitzer

- Sustain access to training and war reserve ammunition by restoring stocks and the selective repair, upgrade and replacement of key ammunition production base equipment and facilities

### **Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation**

The FY 11 budget requests \$10.5 billion, approximately the same amount requested last year.

#### **Compelling Needs:**

- Fund Brigade Combat Team modernization including initial Ground Combat Vehicle development and further development of the second set of Capability Packages.
- Support Network modernization including continued development of WIN-T increment 2 and increment 3.
- Continues the international partnership to develop the Patriot Medium Extended Air Defense systems (MEADS)

### **Construction, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and Army Housing**

FY 11 is a critical year for BRAC since this will be the final budget executed to meet the statutory deadline for many of the BRAC actions. FY 11 will be a particularly challenging year for BRAC as four of our major command headquarters and many of our military schools will be moving to new locations. The FY 11 budget requests \$7.9 billion – a \$2.5 billion decrease from FY 10. This funding supports the construction of facilities to support the growth and re-stationing of Army forces. The OCO request will fund construction in Afghanistan.

**Compelling Needs:**

- Fund BRAC requirements to meet FY 11 statutory timelines
- Support construction of new family housing and improvements to existing housing
- Support construction of permanent party and training barracks

**Other Accounts**

The Army is the executive agent for a variety of critical functions within the Department of Defense, to include the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program. Funding for this account is \$1.6 billion in FY 11 – a decrease of \$100 million from FY10. The Army also has responsibility for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), and Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) appropriations. The Army budgets for recurring sustainment costs of JIEDDO with FY 11 funds at \$200 million – an increase of \$100 million from FY 10. The OCO Request will fund JIEDDO initiatives. The ISFF and ASFF are funded entirely through the OCO request.

**Compelling Needs:**

- Fund the Afghan Security Forces Fund and the Iraq Security Forces Fund to enable building essential security capacity
- Support JIEDDO appropriations and initiatives to combat the most dangerous threat to U.S. forces
- Continue the safe destruction of chemical agents and munitions and the closure activities at selected chemical demilitarization sites

### ***Restoring Fiscal Balance***

Timely and full funding of the Army's FY 11 request of \$245.6 billion will help ensure the Army is ready to meet the needs of the Nation and continue the process of restoring balance while setting the conditions for the future. Over the last eight years, the Army has received significant portions of its funding for combat readiness through OCO appropriations. This recurring reliance on OCO funds and an overlap between base and OCO sustainment programs means that the Army's base budget does not fully cover the cost of both current and future readiness requirements. Because of this reliance, a precipitous drop or delay in OCO funding does not fully fund the readiness of our Army for the current conflict. Army continues the orderly restoration of the balance between base and OCO requirements in its FY 2011 base budget request. This request fully funds Army authorized end strength and brings \$965M in O&M expenses back into the base rather than finance those requirements in OCO.

## ***Addendum B – Reserve Component Readiness***

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum be reported. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704 of NDAA 1996. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 report criteria.

**Section 517 (b) (2) (A). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.**

<b>In the Zone</b>	<b>AC in RC (%) *</b>	<b>Army Average (%) **</b>
<b>FY 2008</b>		
Major	(0 of 1) 0%	92.8 %
Lieutenant Colonel	(1 of 1) 100%	89.1 %
<b>FY 2009</b>		
Major	(56 of 63) 88.9%	94.1%
Lieutenant Colonel	(16 of 20) 80.0%	87.9%

\*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

\*\*Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

**Section 517 (b) (2) (B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).**

<b>Below the Zone</b>	<b>AC in RC (%) *</b>	<b>Army Average (%) **</b>
<b>FY 2008</b>		
Major	(0 of 4) 0%	4.9%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 0) 0%	13.5%
<b>FY 2009</b>		
Major	(2 of 4) 50.0%	6.0%
Lieutenant Colonel	(0 of 1) 0.0%	7.2%

\*Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

\*\*Below-the-zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.

**Section 521(b).**

**1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.**

ARNG officers: 14,760 or 36.3 percent

Army Reserve officers: 19,573 or 59 percent

**2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.**

ARNG enlisted: 85,255 or 26.8 percent

Army Reserve enlisted: 63,311 or 41.6 percent

**3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:**

**a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:**

In FY09, 10 graduates from Service Academies were serving in the Army National Guard to complete their service obligation.

In FY09, 0 graduates from Service Academies were serving in the Army Reserve to complete their service obligation.

**b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:**

In FY09, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

**4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:**

**a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:**

In FY09, no distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduate was released before completing their active-duty service obligation.

**b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:**

In FY09, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

**5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:**

In FY09, one ROTC graduate was released early from their active-duty obligation. The officer is serving the remainder of his/her obligation in the ARNG

**6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported).**

There are no longer active and reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo. Active component officers no longer concur or non-concur with unit vacancy promotion recommendations for officers in associated units according

to section 1113(a). However, unit vacancy promotion boards have active component representation.

In FY09, 2,223 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This number consists of 319 U.S. Army Medical Department, 1,864 Army Promotion List and 40 Chaplains.

In FY09 the estimated percentage of Unit Vacancy Promotions CPT through COL in which an active component representation was on the state unit vacancy promotion board is as follows:

AMEDD 12 %

APL 10 %

Chaplain 13 %

In FY09, 59 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted. This number consists of 9 U.S. Army Medical Department, 47 Army Promotion List, and 3 Chaplains.

**7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.**

In FY09, the ARNG had a total of 201 Noncommissioned Officers receive a military education waiver. As of September 30, 2009 all those waiver recipients were eligible for promotion to the next rank, but none have obtained the military education requirement that was previously waived.

In FY09, the Army Reserve had a total of 331 Soldiers receive a military education waiver. Of these, 124 were SGTs in need of a waiver for Warrior Leader Course (WLC) as a result of being deployed or assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTU) (Medical Hold or Medical Hold-Over Units) whose medical condition was incurred in direct support of Overseas Contingency Operations and who were otherwise eligible for promotion, if recommended. Furthermore, eligible Soldiers lacking the prerequisite level of military education due to operational deployment conflicts or the inability of the Army to schedule the course, were granted waivers. This included 173 Soldiers who were granted waivers for the Basic NCO Course (Now Advanced Leader Course) and 34 Soldiers who were granted waivers for the Advanced NCO Course (now Senior Leader Course).

The Secretary of the Army has delegated the authority for the waivers referred to in section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA to the Director, ARNG and to the Commander, U.S Army Reserve Command. A majority of these waivers were approved due to the Soldiers being deployed and/or performing operational missions. Each reserve component maintains details for each waiver.

**8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve is also provided.)**

In FY09, the ARNG had 61,812 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-availability, incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, unsatisfactory participation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment).

In FY09, the Army Reserve had 49,330 Soldiers considered non-deployable for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-availability, incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, unsatisfactory participation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenberg Amendment).

**9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported.)**

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during FY09 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army National Guard is 141 officers and 15,105 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by the NGB.

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY09 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 63 officers and 2,910 enlisted Soldiers. Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning are separated under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers.

**10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.**

In FY09, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army for the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve.

**11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).**

**a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:**

In FY09, 242,777 ARNG Soldiers underwent a Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) physical. Of these personnel 18,830 or 7.7 percent were identified for review due to a possible deployment limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY09, 115,133 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a PHA physical. Of these personnel 21,505, or 18.68 percent were identified for review due to a possible deployment limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards. The FY 2008-2009 increase is most attributable to PHA physicals now being required annually.

**b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).**

In FY09, 18,830 ARNG Soldiers were transferred from deployable to nondeployable status for failing to meet medical deployability standards. This number includes Soldiers returning from a mobilization with a new medical condition and reflects an increase in the accuracy of electronic databases.

In FY09, 21,505 Army Reserve Soldiers were considered non-available for deployment for failing to meet medical deployability standards. The new PHA physicals being required annually may account for the increase in those being found to be non-deployable.

**12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.**

Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

**13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.**

Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRRA.

**14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.**

Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

**15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.**

Repealed. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

**16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.**

Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) reserve component unit mobilizations are limited to 400-day periods, including a 30-day post-mobilization leave and all post-mobilization training.

The most significant impact of this policy change is that many training tasks previously conducted during the first three to six months of mobilization have been identified for premobilization training, and units are training to standard on as many of these tasks as resources permit. Information on the type of training required by units during postmobilization is maintained by First Army. The data are not captured by state.

ARNG units strive to train in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to prepare for operational missions and reduce post-mobilization training time. The ARFORGEN process requires increased resources for company-level training proficiency prior to mobilization. This training generally consists of individual warrior training tasks, weapons qualification and gunnery, battle staff training, and maneuver training. This is followed by theater-specific tasks and higher level collective training to complete the predeployment requirements for the unit's specific mission. The goal for post-mobilization training time for a brigade-size organization is approximately 60 days.

Post-mobilization training time is contingent upon the amount of certified pre-mobilization training conducted, the type of unit, and its assigned mission. In order to reduce post-mobilization training time, the ARNG has developed programs and products such as the ARNG Battle Command Training Capability, the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC), training devices, and range complexes for our units.

The combination of programs and products, provide units with the capability to accomplish more during pre-mobilization training and therefore reduce post-mobilization training time.

The Army Reserve developed the Regional Training Center (RTC) concept in response to the SECDEF decision to restrict RC mobilizations to one year. These centers provide the capability for Army Reserve units to conduct training on Theater Specific Required Training (TSRT) to theater standards and conditions. The majority of training is on individual tasks but some collective training is also conducted. Because of certification by unit commanders, most of the training is not repeated in post-mobilization status. Exceptions are for tasks incorporated into other required training events and for convoy operations training.

The TSRT training is for units that will deploy to theater, including non-rotational forces (MTOE and TDA). Units mobilizing for CONUS based missions do not require this training.

Each RTC conducts standard rotations throughout the year although each has the capability to adjust training for selected large unit participation. Initially the Army Reserve provided a staff projection to DA that the training would require 17 days, but in actual implementation the training has required 21 days.

Army goals for post-mobilization training for Army Reserve headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 30 to 60 days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army

typically consists of counterinsurgency operations, counter-improvised-explosive-device training, convoy live-fire exercises, theater orientation, rules of engagement/ escalation-of-force training, and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period.

**17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve).**

During FY 09, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley-equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's), the ARNG continued the fielding of the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provides full crew-simulations training for M2A2 units, Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2, and the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 and M2A2. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer XXI, will be the primary simulations trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.

In order to meet the virtual-maneuver training requirements in the ARFORGEN process, M1A1 and M2A2 units use the Close-Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and the Rehosted Simulations Network (SIMNET) XXI, in addition to the Rehosted SIMNET CCTT Core. The CCTT, SIMNET XXI, and SIMNET CCTT provide a mobile training capability to our dispersed units.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of geo-specific databases, provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, 32 VCOT systems are positioned in the ARNG force to train units on the fundamentals of convoy operations.

In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is fielding the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army's approved marksmanship-training device. The ARNG is also continuing use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is complete. The EST 2000 and FATS are also used to provide unit collective tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, and Military Police squads, as well as combat support and combat service support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The ARNG currently has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier's weapon without live ammunition. It is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.

The ARNG has further developed its battle command training capability through the three designated Battle Command Training Centers (BCTCs) at Fort Leavenworth, Camp Dodge, and Fort Indiantown Gap, and the Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP). BCTCs provide the backbone of the program as collective hubs in the battle command training strategy. The DBSP provides Commanders assistance from Commander's Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Technical Support Teams. BCTCs and the DBSP collectively help units in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that augments the Department of the Army-directed Warfighter Exercises and greatly enhances battle staff and unit proficiency.

In order to provide the critical culminating training event of ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the XCTC. The XCTC program provides the method to certify that ARNG combat units have achieved company-level maneuver proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training technologies to replicate the training experience until now only found at one of the Army's Combat Training Centers.

The centerpiece of the XCTC is the Deployable Force-on-Force Instrumented Range System (DFIRST). DFIRST utilizes training technologies that allow for full instrumentation of the training area from major combat systems down to the individual Soldier, role player, and Civilian on the battlefield.

The most important part of every training exercise is the After-Action Review (AAR). By full instrumentation of the units, Soldiers, and training areas, units receive an AAR complete with two-dimensional, three-dimensional, and video playback of the actual training exercise. This allows Commanders and Soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from a different perspective, further enhancing the training experience.

The Army Reserve continues to leverage—to the extent resources permit—TADSS into its training program. Implementation of Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72 continues with establishment of the 75th Battle Command Training Division (BCTD) (Provisional). This division, with five battle command training brigades, employs legacy constructive simulations to provide battle command and staff training to Army Reserve and Army National Guard battalion and brigade commanders and staffs during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization. The concept plan as well as requirements for supporting Army battle command systems and simulations drivers for the 75th BCTD is pending Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) approval.

The Army Reserve continues to partner with the Program Executive Office, Simulations, Training and Instrumentation; Training and

Doctrine Command agencies; and HQDA to define TADSS requirements for combat support and combat service support units. The 75th BCTD is on the Entity-level Resolution Federation (ERF) fielding plan. The ERF provides a high-resolution (e.g., individual Soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training simulation.

The LMTS and EST 2000 remain essential elements of Army Reserve marksmanship training. LMTS procurement continues, and distribution throughout the Army Reserve force continues to increase. The LMTS has also been adapted to support convoy operations training. In either individual pre-marksmanship training or convoy modes, the system allows the Soldier to use an assigned weapon, as well as crew-served weapons, in a simulation/training mode. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.

The Army Reserve also has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive "live" time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. In 2007 the Army Reserve invested in communications infrastructure so that the MITS at Mare Island, California can communicate and interact with another Army MITS at Fort Eustis, Virginia. This provides the capability to conduct distributed multi-boat collective training among all the simulators. Of note, the MITS is also

used by U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and harbor management agencies. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units. Other simulator requirements are being identified in requirements documents.

**18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:**

**a. Explanations of the information:**

Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

**b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121:**

Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

**19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:**

**a. The number of such inspections;**

**b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;**

**c. The number of units inspected; and**

**d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.**

During FY09, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 947 inspections of the ARNG, inspecting 1,403 ARNG units. The bulk of these inspections, 711, were executed by Regular Army officers assigned to the respective States and Territories as Inspectors General. First Army and the Department of the Army Inspectors General conducted 96 of the inspections, and the remaining 140 by the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM); and the U.S. Army Audit Agency.

Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass / fail rating. Results of such inspections may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.

Operational Readiness Evaluation data for the Force Support Package and expanded separate brigades are unavailable, as inspections thereof were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data are maintained at the state level and are available upon request from state level-training readiness officials.

In accordance with AR 1-201, *Army Inspection Policy*, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of regional readiness commands and direct support units within requirements of the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). Per the Army Regulation, OIPs at division levels and above mainly comprise staff inspections, staff assistance visits, and Inspectors General. Staff inspections are only one aspect by which Commanding Generals can evaluate the readiness of their commands. The Inspector General conducts inspections and special assessments based on systemic issues and trends analysis with emphasis on issues that could impede the readiness of the Army Reserve.

The Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in FY09 prompted by concerns over systemic issues. One was the Special Assessment of Training Management. Its objective was to determine if units in the Army Reserve were in compliance with Command Training Guidance for Training Years 2008-2010, with emphasis on the execution of weapons training, remedial training, qualification, and ammunition availability. This assessment also encompassed an annual regulatory review of compliance with and effectiveness of the Army Voting Assistance Program, a program of special interest to the Department of the Army. Another was the Special Assessment of the Impact of Army Reserve Equipment Shortages (Funding/Availability/Modernization) and Training with the US Army Reserve Command (USARC), which evaluated training issues due to equipment shortages and the affect it had on our Soldiers' morale.

The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a combination of Battle-Focused Readiness Reviews (BFRRs) and staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits conforming to regulatory requirements of AR 1-201. The BFRR is the tool used by major subordinate Commanders to provide the Army Reserve Commanding General a status on resources and readiness of their commands, and resolve systemic issues/trends in order to achieve continuous improvements in readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 19 BFRRs in FY09, while inspecting 65 units. The staff assistance visits were more oriented to a particular topic in the staff proponent's area.

**20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRRA.**

There are no longer ground combat active or reserve component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

As FORSCOM's executive agent, First Army and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) for Pacific based Reserve Component units, execute active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with reserve component units. When reserve component units are mobilized, they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.

Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs primarily during training and readiness activities at mobilization stations, with direct oversight by First Army, USARPAC, and FORSCOM.

**21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.**

<b>Title XI (FY 09) Authorizations</b>				
	<b>OFF</b>	<b>ENL</b>	<b>WO</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
U.S. Army Reserve	97	110	8	215
TRADOC	50	3	0	53
FORSCOM	979	2,165	101	3,245
USARPAC	30	49	1	80
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,156</b>	<b>2,327</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>3,593</b>

<b>Title XI (FY 09) Assigned</b>				
	<b>OFF</b>	<b>ENL</b>	<b>WO</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
U.S. Army Reserve	28	77	7	112
TRADOC	5	5	0	10
FORSCOM	659	2,119	85	2,863
USARPAC	28	53	1	82
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>720</b>	<b>2,254</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>3,067</b>

As of September 30, 2009, the Army had 3,067 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (NDAA 2005, Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) carefully manage the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data is captured at the command level. The actual duty location for each position is not captured down to the state level of detail.