Statement of
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Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Before the House Armed Services Committee
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Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department of Defense efficiency initiatives.

British military strategist J.F.C. Fuller wrote, "The first duty of the grand strategist is to appreciate the commercial and financial position of his country." Sustained economic power is at the root of sustainable military power. This understanding drives the efficiency initiatives. The decisions should not be viewed as stand-alone activities, but rather, as the next steps in an evolutionary process to change the way the Pentagon does business.

America remains a nation at war. We have Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coastguardsman deployed around the world, many engaged in combat. We have transitioned from combat operations in Iraq, but our effort in Afghanistan has intensified. Further, demographic, cultural and geopolitical realities require us to prepare for a future where our forces may be engaged in persistent conflict. The leadership of this Department is committed to ensuring the force is sufficient and well equipped. Efficiency initiatives are aimed at increasing our "tooth to tail" ratio.

The nature of conflict in the 21st Century continues to evolve and threats span the spectrum of conflict. The intentions of those who wish to harm us are enabled by the power of information technology (IT). We must be able to adapt our strategy, weapon systems, and organizations to a construct that recognizes, mitigates, and defends against these new vulnerabilties of the information age. With this accelerated pace, we must develop a strategic and organizational construct agile enough to stay competitive.

Given the nation's economic situation, we recognize budgets will not grow at the rate they have since 9/11. DoD requires modest real budget

growth of 2-3% annually to maintain and equip a nation at war, but projected budgets for Fiscal Years 10-15 only project 1% growth, based on DoD inflation assumptions. Additionally, there is risk the projected 1% real growth may not be realized. To help ensure sufficient resources for our highest priorities, we must seek efficiency within current budgets. We owe it to the war fighters, and the taxpayers, to adapt our strategy, weapons and organizations to effectively conduct 21st Century warfare, and to conduct those operations efficiently.

The work conducted as part of the strategic reviews we released last year includes examples where we made these types of changes. In the Quadrennial Defense Review we shifted priority to concentrate efforts on the wars we are currently in. In the National Space Policy, we wrote of initiatives to increase partnerships with other nations in order to ensure space systems remained affordable. We cancelled weapon system programs that were chronically over budget, and redirected others to better align with evolving threats.

After making these adjustments in our strategy and weapons, we sought ways to streamline our organizational structure. Secretary Lynn described our general approach. Three specific initiatives are; the rebuilding and strengthening of the DoD CIO, the consolidation of IT for common use and better cyber defense, and the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

Our national dependence on IT for almost every aspect of our lives has accelerated, and DoD is no exception to this trend; DoD has witnessed a similarly rapid growth in the number of offices in the Department tasked to manage IT. Multiple organizations on multiple staffs at multiple layers of our hierarchy exist to oversee IT. The result is a complex web of authorities and responsibilities that is unclear and difficult to navigate. Combatant Commanders simply do not understand what organization they need to visit in order to get work executed. The need to clarify organizational roles and responsibilities for IT has become obvious. With the establishment of CYBER COMMAND earlier this year, the Department focused operational responsibility for this domain in one organization, compliant with legal requirements.

With the operational aspects of cyber defense assigned to CYBER COMMAND, we then needed to assign the policy and oversight responsibilities for that capability. To eliminate duplication across organizations, the operational functions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, the J-6 Directorate on the Joint Staff, and portions of JFCOM will shift to CYBER COMMAND; the CIO-related functions of these organizations will be transferred into a strengthened Chief Information Officer ("CIO"). Acquisition functions will be realigned consistent with the final report of the Information Technology Acquisition Reform task force.

The recommended disestablishment of U.S. Joint Forces Command by the Secretary of Defense also recognizes our changing times. When JFCOM was stood up in 1999, its central mission was to drive jointness into everything the military does. It was understood that the creation of JFCOM for this purpose would result in the addition of an organization layer. At that time, it was judged that the imperative to advance jointness was greater than the costs associated with establishing a new command. Jointness is difficult to measure, but the goal of embracing joint operations and doctrine has reached a point where a four-star headquarters for joint advocacy is no longer required. We have embraced jointness as a matter of necessity. Evidence of this progression is manifested on the battlefield and in our military schools. We have reached critical mass, where our military accepts "joint" as the preferred method of war.

We must continue along the positive joint vectors and activities directed by Goldwater-Nichols. In addition, we must establish or improve on our processes and structures in the combined and interagency arenas. We fight as part of coalitions and alliances, and our level of success in these operations is enhanced by the degree we are synchronized with our international partners. The nature of today's conflict also requires better integration through the interagency process. Strengthening capabilities and capacities through the "whole of our government" is increasingly important to our success.

However, we must avoid unintended redundancies and layering that can result from these efforts. Decision making in today's environments requires speed. Battlefields change too quickly. Our staffs and structures need to be flatter and faster. Redundancies and layering within our system is an impediment to success.

Finally, disestablishing JFCOM will allow us to better align operational responsibilities with service train and equip functions in order to reduce inefficiencies as forces are presented to Combatant Commanders. JFCOM succeeded in helping push the services to jointness. But that vision has largely been achieved and we believe we can no longer justify the expense and overhead associated with maintaining a separate four-star combatant command for that purpose.

The changes I have discussed in this statement have the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are needed to further our goal of creating a more effective and efficient Department of Defense. There are two major beneficiaries of these changes. The first are the war fighters, who will be better postured with the resources they need to fight and win. The second is the taxpayer, who will not only have a more effective military for 21st Century security, but will also witness and increased value in their defense dollar.